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PREFACE
Casual readers of this monograph may interpret
it as a somewhat fatalistic description of all of the
things the Army Reserve cannot be or do, but, in fact,
the intent is the opposite. If this invaluable American
national security institution is to realize its full potential in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing
world, we must first make a clear-eyed and honest
assessment of the institution’s inherent limitations as
well as its untapped potential. The first steps in attacking any problem are to acknowledge it and then define
it before proposing ways to solve it. These are the goals
of this monograph.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, successful armies anticipated the
future, adapted, and capitalized upon opportunities.
Today, the Army faces a rapidly changing security
environment that requires . . . difficult decisions in order
to remain an effective instrument of the Nation’s military
power.
General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the US Army (CSA),
in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,
April 7, 2016.1

The US Army Reserve has been a remarkably
malleable and adaptable institution over its history,
and it is time for it to adapt again. Since its inception
as an organized medical reserve corps in 1908, the
Army Reserve has made important, diverse, and costeffective contributions to the Army, the Joint Force,
and the nation, each tailored to the specific needs of
the moment. Now, at the center of the Army’s new
operating concept—first expressed in 2014 in Win in
a Complex World and refined in an update focused
on multi-domain operations in 2018—is the idea of
emerging, complex national security threats, some of
which are unknown, others of which are unknowable.2
In its essence, the operating concept asks Army leaders to prepare for a rapidly changing and increasingly
unstable world in which we do not fully understand
1. Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR), “America’s
Army Reserve at a Glance” (Washington, DC: The Pentagon,
2018), inside cover.
2. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-3-1: The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex
World, 2020-2040 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, October 31, 2014),
iii-v. See also TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1: The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 6,
2018).
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what capabilities we might need or when we might
need them.
This challenging and uncertain threat environment is exacerbated by the emergence of peer or
near-peer adversaries carrying out asymmetric and
multi-domain operations within a context of failing or
failed states, a wavering international system, rapidly
proliferating advanced technologies, and other destabilizing global developments. The emerging threat
environment is even more problematic when juxtaposed with the modern realities of mounting Army
personnel costs, a persistently high demand for forces,
unsustainable federal budget deficits, and uncertain
defense budgets for the foreseeable future.
Further complicating these challenges are concerning trends in American society, among them a
declining eligibility of young Americans to serve in
the military, a declining propensity to serve, and an
increasing concentration of that propensity among
certain families and in particular states. Not only do
these troubling trends present mounting obstacles
to Army recruiters, but they also raise the specter of
a military at risk of becoming increasingly detached
from the civil society it serves.
When considered together, these challenges make
it clear that the Army cannot afford to waste any
resource or leave any potential contribution untapped.
Fortunately, the Army Reserve has proven over its
history that it can adapt as needed to provide diverse
and cost-effective, complementary and supplementary capabilities to the Army, the Joint Force, and our
interagency partners. An examination of the Army
Reserve’s history also makes it clear that these past
organizational adaptations have been anything but
incremental in nature. Moreover, at critical junctures
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in our history, the Army Reserve’s contributions to the
nation have extended well-beyond the achievement of
traditional US national security objectives, stretching
to encompass contributions in the realm of economic
security in times of economic privation, among other
impacts. These nontraditional contributions have
often been enabled by Army Reserve soldiers’ civilianacquired skills.
Presently, however, many of these valuable
capabilities, whether they are conventional or nontraditional, are largely unready, underdeveloped,
untapped, or inaccessible altogether. Specifically,
access is inhibited by a series of structural realities,
institutional limitations, current personnel policies,
and basic inefficiencies. Each of these structural and
institutional limitations must be overcome before the
Army Reserve’s invaluable capabilities can be made
ready for mobilization, deployment, and utilization in
support of US national security objectives and the protection of other vital national interests.
In light of these challenges, there are three primary
goals that drive the reform proposals that follow. The
first goal, which is focused on the near term, is to optimize the application of scarce resources to achieve the
best possible levels of mission readiness among the
Army Reserve’s current mix of capabilities. We then
turn our attention to a set of more profound reforms
intended to enable the Army Reserve to build strategic readiness now and in the future—changes that will
require correspondingly heavier institutional and legislative lifts to bring about. Lastly, we take aim at the
unknown and unknowable challenges of the emerging
security environment, challenges that are described
in the Army’s current operating concept; in the more
recent thinking on multi-domain operations; in the
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National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2018; and in other
recent, national strategic guidance. This third set of
reforms seeks to realize nontraditional forms of Army
Reserve contributions that can support multi-domain
operations across the spectrum of conflict and within
a context of reemerging great-power competition and
mounting uncertainty.
To achieve these goals, the monograph begins with
an honest and direct assessment of the modern Army
Reserve’s structural realities, institutional limitations,
and untapped potential placed within the context
of the challenges of the emerging strategic environment. The monograph then proposes a corresponding
series of reforms that will enable the Army Reserve to
take full advantage of this invaluable national security resource. They are divided into three categories,
including
• quick wins—a set of reforms aimed at maximizing Army Reserve readiness in the near term by
optimizing the application of current resources
and authorities, with a specific focus on enhancing Army Reserve mission command;
• heavy lifts—more substantial adaptations of
Army Reserve structures, systems, and processes to align the institution with emerging
modern realities and which are aimed at achieving enduring strategic readiness; and
• deep reforms—significant enhancements of the
Army Reserve as an institution aimed at providing the Army and our nation with muchneeded strategic and operational flexibility as
we confront the challenges of an increasingly
daunting, uncertain, and risk-laden future.

4

PART I:
THE HISTORICAL
AND
STRATEGIC CONTEXT
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1. AN ADAPTABLE, MALLEABLE, AND
SCALABLE INSTITUTION
The purpose of each reserve component is to provide
trained units and qualified persons available for active
duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national
emergency, and at such other times as the national
security may require.
10 U.S.C. 10102

Over its distinguished history, the Army Reserve
has made significant and diverse contributions to the
nation both inside and outside of the realm of national
security. With unofficial roots in the requirement for
the on campus military training of citizen-soldiers
specified by the Morill Act of 1862 as well as the US
government’s creation of a Veteran Reserve Corps
during the Civil War, the Army Reserve was formally created by Congress on April 23, 1908, as the US
Army’s Medical Reserve Corps.3 In this first configuration, which consisted of a small contingent of medical professionals, the Army Reserve was intended to
provide a cost-effective means of bridging the significant gap in the Army’s medical capabilities that had
been exposed during the Spanish-American War.
This new reserve force offered the federal government a variety of substantial advantages when compared with its Regular Army and National Guard
counterparts. For example, as a part-time force comprised of volunteers to be mobilized solely on an
as-needed basis, this reserve force was highly costeffective since each mobilization of required medical capabilities could be tailored to the specific needs
3. Lee S. Harford Jr., Warrior-Citizens of America (Fort McPherson, GA: Office of Army Reserve History, January 2007), 8-10.
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of each military operation. Likewise, the citizensoldiers’ required medical training would take place
almost entirely within the civilian workplace, meaning that the civilian medical sector would absorb the
bulk of the costs of the soldiers’ medical training. The
military would also benefit from having its reserve
doctors positioned in the civilian sector where they
would have access to cutting-edge advances in medicine, again at no cost to the government. And unlike
the state militias, this reserve force would fall fully
under the federal government’s control. These special
characteristics have been part of the Army Reserve’s
DNA from the beginning, and they remain key features of the institution’s organizational culture today.
Anticipating the possibility of armed conflict in
Europe prior to US involvement in World War I, Congress included provisions in the National Defense
Act of 1916 that created an Officer’s Reserve Corps,
an Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve Officer’s
Training Corps, each under federal control.4 Once
the nation entered World War I, the Army Reserve
demonstrated its scalability by producing almost
90,000 Reserve officers who served during the conflict,
with about one-third of them being Army doctors.
The Army Reserve also provided more than 80,000
enlisted soldiers, with about 15,000 of them serving
in medical fields. In the interwar period after World
War I, the Army Reserve demonstrated its adaptability
as the Army planned for a Reserve force of 33 maneuver divisions. Some of these divisions merely existed
on paper, while others had actual cadre assigned to

4. Harford, Warrior-Citizens, 10.
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them, but each had value as a means of facilitating the
rapid expansion of the Army should it be needed.5
Demonstrating its inherent adaptability, the Army
Reserve’s contributions to the nation were multifaceted in the 1930s and 1940s. After the United States
plunged into the Great Depression during 1929, and
upon Franklin Roosevelt’s election as president in
1932, the Army Reserve provided the 30,000 officers
who led the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) from
1933 to 1942. These Army Reserve officers supervised
2,700 camps as well as trained and led about 3 million
personnel over the nine-year history of the CCC. The
CCC counted among its achievements the planting of
3 billion trees, the creation of 800 parks, and the construction of countless public roadways and service
buildings. This work continued under the direction
of the Army Reserve until the CCC was disbanded in
1942 as the nation undertook full wartime mobilization and the US economy recovered.6
In addition to contributing to Army war planning in the interwar years, the Army began recalling
Army Reserve officers in June 1940 for premobilization preparation. Ultimately, the Army Reserve contributed 26 Reserve-designated infantry divisions
and another 6 Army Reserve cavalry divisions, each
of which saw combat during World War II. Over
that period, the Army Reserve provided over 100,000
Reserve Officer’s Training Corps graduates, or about
a quarter of all Army officers, as well as more than
200,000 Army Reserve soldiers who served in support
of the war effort.7
5. Office of Army Reserve (USAR) History, Army Reserve: A
Concise History (Fort Bragg, NC: USAR, 2013), 4-6.
6. USAR History, Concise History, 6.
7. USAR History, Concise History, 6.
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The Army Reserve’s contributions to conflicts
since World War II have been equally significant.
Other major commitments of Army Reserve soldiers
have included 240,000 soldiers who served during the
Korean War, 68,000 troops mobilized during the Berlin
Crisis, 6,000 troops who served in Vietnam, and 80,000
troops who served in Operation Desert Storm.8 Other
significant troop contributions have included mobilizations of about 16,000 troops in support of operations in Bosnia as well as other smaller mobilizations
in support of missions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Sinai
Desert. Since September 11, 2001, the Army Reserve
has provided about 300,000 soldier-years of support
to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Guantanamo
Bay, in addition to supporting other stateside security
requirements.
In terms of reliability, the Army Reserve has
always answered the call of duty, including not missing one late arrival date during more than a decade of
mobilizations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and other
concurrent missions. Recent analysis completed by the
Institute for Defense Analyses and commissioned by
the Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB) for the Office of
the Secretary of Defense demonstrated that there were
no statistically significant differences between active
component and reserve component performance in
OIF once the forces had been deployed. In its findings,
the Institute for Defense Analyses characterized the

8. USAR History, Concise History, 8-15.
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operational relationship between components as one
of “shared burden” and “shared risk.”9
Although they applied both quantitative and qualitative methodologies in their analysis, the Institute
for Defense Analyses analysts were not able to capture
the magnitude of the other-than-kinetic support to
OEF and OIF in any systematic or quantitative fashion. But they acknowledged the disproportionate and
important contributions of the reserve components in
terms of the key tasks required to open, set, and sustain the two operational theaters. At the same time,
the researchers also noted that the repeated mobilizations of these formations had necessitated major
cross-leveling of personnel and equipment among
most units as well as a major infusion of postmobilization resources to build deployable units, at least in
the cases of the Army National Guard and the Army
Reserve. A separate Institute for Defense Analyses
analysis also demonstrated these reserve component
mobilizations are cost-effective when the fully burdened life cycle costs of the various components are
captured and considered.10 That said, it is important to
note that the post-mobilization training timelines for
these formations were not insignificant, especially for
9. Arnold L. Punaro, MajGen (USMCR) to Secretary of
Defense James Mattis, information memorandum, “Transmittal
of Institute for Defense Analyses Report for the Reserve Forces
Policy Board (RFPB) titled Sharing the Burden and Risk: An Operational Assessment of the Reserve Components in Operation Iraqi Freedom,” January 23, 2017, http://rfpb.defense.gov/Portals/67/Documents
/Reports/Transmittal%20letter%20Operational%20Eff.%20Study%20
Phase%20I.pdf?ver=2017-02-16-093403-350.
10. RFPB, Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard
and Reserves: A Report for the Transition to the New Administration by
the Reserve Forces Policy Board, RFPB Report 17-01 (Falls Church,
VA: RFPB, November 1, 2016), 20-23.
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the combat and combat support formations in the land
force elements that were mobilized.
Other recent analysis describes other less obvious
but still significant contributions from reserve components. For example, successive base realignment and
closure commissions have consolidated active Army
units at fewer installations. By concentrating a smaller
active Army in a handful of large posts across the country, the base realignment and closure commissions
have inadvertently lessened the frequency of routine
contact between the active Army and the American
public. The Army Reserve, on the other hand, remains
a decentralized and geographically dispersed federal
force with more than 1,000 facilities spread throughout the nation. Army Reserve soldiers live and work
in all 50 states and in other territories where they
help to bridge the gap between those serving and the
public they serve. As a result, Army Reserve soldiers
have routine and frequent contact with civic leaders
and the population from which we all recruit, and
they live within the society that we defend. Likewise,
the seven reserve components—of which the Army
Reserve comprises 24 percent of the total—serve in
approximately 3,000 communities across the United
States.11 The Army Reserve is connected to the American public in 6,605 facilities located in 1,061 Army
Reserve centers spread across the nation.12
Like the other reserve components, the Army
Reserve also makes a variety of other significant contributions to the nation. These contributions include
providing the capacity to surge forces in the event
of protracted operations, thus affording the nation a
hedge against operational and strategic risk. The Army
11. Improving the Total Force, 20, 24.
12. Improving the Total Force, 66, 68.
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Reserve also provides the Army an opportunity to
simultaneously retain active personnel through a continuum of service and deliver specialized or complementary capabilities when needed to meet recurring
or emergent requirements.13 In sum, since its inception
in 1908, the Army Reserve has served the nation well
as an adaptable, tailorable, scalable, and cost-effective
federal force in the face of new threats and changing
circumstances. That said, the emerging strategic and
operational environment suggests it is time for the
Army Reserve to adapt again.

13. Improving the Total Force, 18-20.
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2. EMERGING, COMPLEX THREATS AND
ACCELERATING CHANGE
We are facing increased global disorder . . . creating a
security environment more complex and volatile than
any we have experienced . . . This increasingly complex
security environment is defined by rapid technological
change, challenges from adversaries in every operating
domain.
Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America14

The US defense establishment’s preoccupation
with protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq
after 9/11 brought with it a series of unintended and
adverse consequences. The first category of adverse
impacts came in the form of necessary but unproductive resource consumption. For more than a decade,
debt-fueled wartime spending purchased impermanent, niche capabilities, such as mine-resistant
ambush protected vehicles, rather than investing in
genuine force development and modernization. At
the same time, the intensive manpower demands
of extended counterinsurgencies and simultaneous
stability operations in two active theaters translated
into rapidly expanding personnel costs. Among these
war-connected costs were major recruiting and retention incentives, increased pay and benefits, escalating health care obligations, and other expenditures
required for growing and maintaining a much larger
ground force in time of war.
14. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Summary of the 2018
National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1.
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Just as troubling, a second category of adverse
impacts came in the form of a collective distraction
from significant transformations among our potential
adversaries. As the US military strained to meet the
demands of operations in two manpower-intensive
theaters and as we surged resources first to Iraq and
then Afghanistan, we were effectively distracted from
major gains in capability and capacity among global
competitors. During more than a decade of decisive
US engagement elsewhere, near-peer competitors
adapted and improved their own capabilities, most
often with the specific goal of countering US strengths.
This period of US distraction enabled both Russia
and China to grasp the import and potential of multidomain and gray-zone operations more quickly
than the United States, placing us in the uncomfortable position of having to play catch-up with
foreign powers.
At the same time, the world itself was changing in
profound ways. Rapid developments in technology,
the proliferation of social media, emerging weakness
in the global order, and other concurrent changes in
the human condition were simultaneously bringing
about game-changing differences in the modern operational environment. These social, economic, political,
demographic, climatic, and technological developments were combining to reshape the world and alter
the threat environment in a variety of fundamental
ways, all laden with significant risk. Taken together,
the adverse impacts of the protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq diverted scarce defense resources
toward near-term requirements to support counterinsurgency, reconstruction, and stability operations and
came with steep opportunity costs.
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In the early 2010s, as the wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq began to consume less of the senior defense leadership’s focused attention, national security professionals began to focus on present and future changes
to the operational environment. As a significant step
in this direction, in 2014, the Army published Win in
a Complex World, its updated operating concept. In its
essence, Win in a Complex World envisions a next generation of warfare in which the Army’s goal is to simultaneously provide leadership with multiple options
across multiple domains and team with multiple partners, all in order to confront potential adversaries with
multiple, simultaneous dilemmas. In its description of
Army core competencies, the operating concept adds
“set the theater” and “shape security environments”
to the list of Army missions, tasks that feature significant Army Reserve roles under the current organization of capabilities among Army components.15
In its description of the emerging operational environment, the operating concept offers a wide-ranging
inventory of rising and evolving threats. Among them
are transnational terrorist organizations, transnational
criminal organizations, proliferating weapons of mass
destruction, and progressively more dangerous and
accessible cyberspace and counter-space capabilities.
Complicating matters further, these threats are set
against a backdrop of an increased velocity of human
interaction, destabilizing demographic changes, a
widespread rise in urban populations, and the increasingly common failure of governments to provide
basic services or secure borders during conflict.16 The

15. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (2014), iv.
16. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (2014), 11-14.
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operating concept also identifies technological or strategic surprise as a further area of major potential risk.17
The operating concept goes on to identify an
expansive list of Army Warfighting Challenges
(AWFCs) that must be solved in these developing circumstances. As a fully engaged, total force partner,
the Army Reserve will undoubtedly contribute to the
efforts to solve many, if not most, of the “first-order
problems” represented across the full list of AWFCs.
But there are multiple challenges on the list of AWFCs
for which the civilian-acquired, other-than-military
competencies of Army Reserve soldiers might prove
especially helpful. Among others, the Army Reserve
could potentially make valuable, nontraditional contributions to the following AWFCs:
• develop situational understanding (AWFC #1)
• shape the security environment (AWFC #2
and #3)
• adapt the institutional Army and innovate
(AWFC #4)
• conduct homeland operations (AWFC #6)
• conduct space and cyber electromagnetic operations and maintain communications (AWFC #7)
• improve soldier, leader, and team performance
(AWFC #9)
• develop agile and adaptive leaders (AWFC #10)
• conduct wide area security (AWFC #13)
• ensure interoperability and operate in a joint,
interorganizational, and multinational environment (AWFC #14)18
17. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (2014), annex D.
18. Training and Doctrine Command, “Army Warfighting
Challenges” (Fort Eustis, VA: Department of the Army, January
31, 2017).
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Given its primary focus of addressing the emerging challenges of unified land operations in a decisive
action environment, the Army operating concept says
little about the recurring challenges of building partner capacity. But history shows that the United States
has intervened in the affairs of other nations regularly
when it has suited our national interests. Therefore,
while there is little in the operating concept regarding
the particular challenges of reconstruction and stability
operations, the United States can expect to engage in
these types of operations again in the future, especially
given the wavering international order and the prevalence of failed and failing states. The Army Reserve is
already well-positioned to assist with host-nation military and police force development. But the institution
can also be adapted relatively easily to be a solid fit
with tasks connected to the development of the rule
of law, governance, host-nation economies, infrastructure enhancement, and other nonkinetic lines of effort
(LOEs) often required to be performed in nonpermissive security environments.
Building upon this emerging body of thinking,
in 2016 the Joint Chiefs of Staff published its own
assessment of the emerging threat environment. Formally entitled Joint Operating Environment 2035: The
Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World, the JOE
offers a daunting view of the future. It predicts persistent disorder, contested norms (or a changing of
norms and rules by state and nonstate actors), new
poles of economic power, rebalanced energy security,
a growth in state-sponsored cyberforces, and an erosion of the standing institutions of international order.
The JOE also identifies other major security challenges
in the form of the “connected consequences of fragile
and failing states,” an accelerating diffusion of power,
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globalized criminal and terrorist networks, disruptive
manufacturing technologies, and the weaponization
of commercial technologies.19 As a primarily defensefocused work, the JOE does not emphasize the looming
impacts of demographic, climatic, and environmental
changes, or the fundamental changes to the nature of
work and the global economy that are already wellunderway, such as globalization, automation, and
other factors. Taken together, however, the JOE portrays the future as one of profound and accelerating
changes that cannot help but be destabilizing.
In the run-up to the 2016 election, former Secretary of State George Shultz assembled a group
of experienced thought leaders to offer their own
national security assessments, among them thenretired Marine General James Mattis. Mattis and his coauthors excoriated what they viewed as a reactive foreign policy suffering from the absence of a strategic
center as well as America’s slow grasp of dangerous
changes in our potential adversaries and the world.20
The leaders’ broad critique expressed concerns over
a rising China and revanchist Russia, and they cited
the declining health of the international order as
another major source of risk. The authors also noted
the increasing weakness within America’s diplomatic
instrument of national power coupled with a loss of
“focus on warfighting” 40 years into the all-volunteer force as another major cause for concern.21 Mattis
and his coauthors issued a call for a whole-of-government approach to national security, noting that the
19. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operating Environment 2035: The
Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World (Washington, DC:
The Pentagon, July 14, 2016), ii-14.
20. George P. Shultz, ed., Blueprint for America (Stanford:
Hoover Institution Press, 2016), 137-143.
21. Shultz, Blueprint, 141-142.
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American government had become too focused on the
use of the military instrument at the clear expense of
civilian agencies and departments.
Senior leaders within the US Army and Department of Defense (DoD) were also working to understand these emergent national security challenges and
to chart a course for dealing with them. In October
2016, as Shultz’s edited volume was published, the
Army leadership was rolling out its own analysis of
the emerging threats and the shape of the future force
required to meet them. CSA Mark Milley used his keynote speech at the annual meeting of the Association of
the US Army to issue a call to combine emerging technologies as quickly as possible to defeat strong adversaries. Expressing his own concerns about revisionist
states, including a revanchist Russia, Milley described
an extremely lethal battlefield of the near future, one
characterized by the proliferation of surveillance, a
concurrent proliferation of precision munitions, and
widespread access to most capabilities made possible
by the emergence of the Internet of Things and other
emerging technologies.22 Noting that what can be seen
can be hit, Milley described a need for smaller formations that would need to conceal, cover, and move
frequently for their survival as well as a force that
must be designed, manned, trained, equipped, and
led to meet the demands of increasingly lethal combat
against near-peer competitors.
At the same 2016 conference, General David Perkins of US Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) framed the future force requirements
22. Rick Maze, ed., “Radical Change Is Coming: Gen. Mark
A. Milley Not Talking about Just Tinkering around the Edges,”
Association of the United States Army, December 13, 2016, https://
www.ausa.org/articles/radical-change-coming-gen-mark-milley.
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Milley outlined in terms of “multi-domain battle.”
Describing fires and effects across the five domains of
land, air, sea, space, and cyber as the new joint force
paradigm, Perkins emphasized newly required capabilities as well as a need to prepare to fight in cities.23
Of note, Perkins also highlighted the growing difficulty of staying ahead of the talent, research, and
development curves of civilian industry and technology as a looming challenge for the Army and DoD.
Other uniformed Army leaders have offered their
own assessments and prescriptions more recently. In
addition to the publication of a joint US Army–Marine
Corps white paper on multi-domain battle early in
2017, General Robert Abrams, then of US Army Forces
Command, reinforced the need to focus on decisive action and combined arms maneuver against a
near-peer, hybrid threat. In October 2017, the Army
updated Field Manual 3-0, Operations, which provides
an overview of the changes in the operating environment and represents the next step forward in the
Army’s adaptation to emerging and evolving threats
and a changing world.
In a companion piece published in Military Review
in late 2017, Lieutenant General Michael Lundy of the
Combined Arms Center noted a need for wholesale
changes in Army culture in the aftermath of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. He called for
refocusing on decisive action operations rather than
counterinsurgency and for rebuilding “our Army’s
readiness to prevail in large-scale ground combat
23. David G. Perkins, GEN (USA), “Multi-Domain Battle:
Joint Combined Arms Concept for the 21st Century,” Association
of the United States Army, November 14, 2016, https://www.ausa
.org/articles/multi-domain-battle-joint-combined-arms.
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against opponents with peer capabilities,” among
other needed changes.24
Late in 2017, Acting Secretary of the Army
(SecArmy) Ryan McCarthy outlined six major
modernization priorities, among them long-range
precision fires, an improved Army network, and nextgeneration ground and air combat vehicles.25 McCar
thy also noted the lack of agility in Army and DoD
procurement and equipment fielding processes as
well as an inability to keep up with the pace of change
in the private sector and the world. Shortly thereafter,
then-SecArmy Mark Esper reinforced those messages
in his own call for heightened operational readiness to deal with emerging, near-peer threats and for
cross-functional teams of operators needed to truncate
the time required to get needed capabilities into the
hands of soldiers in the field.26
In the same vein, General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sees the emerging strategic and operational environments and
the accelerating pace of change as an imperative for
transformation across the Joint Force.27 In his call
for holistic and innovative approaches to solving
complex national security problems that are transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional in nature,
24. Michael Lundy, LTG (USA), and Rich Creed, COL (USA),
“The Return of US Army Field Manual 3-0, ‘Operations’,” Military
Review (November-December 2017): 14-15.
25. CSA Mark A. Milley and SecArmy (Acting) Ryan D.
McCarthy, Modernization Priorities for the United States Army
(Washington, DC: The Pentagon, October 3, 2017).
26. Meghann Myers, “New in 2018: Army Secretary Lays Out His Priorities,” Army Times, December 27,
2017,
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/12/27
/new-in-2018-army-secretary-lays-out-his-priorities/.
27. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., GEN (USA), “The Pace of Change,”
Joint Force Quarterly 84 (1st Quarter, 2017): 2.
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he calls for enhanced strategic thinking and innovative security options.
Perhaps most significantly, however, Secretary of
Defense James Mattis brought together the threads
of this thinking on emerging threats and future force
requirements when he issued a new NDS in February 2018. In his strategic guidance, Mattis emphasized
the “reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” by “revisionist powers” as the proximate threat
to the United States against a backdrop of the threats
and changes to the operational environment identified within the national security community.28 In
December 2018, the Army expanded this line of thinking with a revision of the Army operating concept
that focuses specifically on the challenges of multidomain operations.29
For all of this attention on emerging threats and
changes in the world order, however, it is possible,
if not likely, that we may be underestimating the
scope and magnitude of the changes to come. Viewed
from this perspective, the Army’s operating concept is actually fairly conventional in the sense that
while it broadly describes major technological and
societal change and it issues a call for cross-domain
operations, it does not really account for the fact that
entirely new ways of waging war are likely to emerge
in the not-too-distant future. Put another way, we
are all products of our own formative experiences,
including our senior leaders’ grounding in twentiethcentury technologies and perspectives, and are

28. Mattis, Summary, 1-2.
29. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (2018).
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therefore unlikely to anticipate the full magnitude of
the dramatic changes to come.30
Researchers at the cutting edge of developing technologies describe a near-future world fraught with
these more dramatic threats and opportunities. In his
2017 book Future War, retired Air Force Major General
Robert Latiff describes astounding emergent technologies that have the clear potential to alter war in inconceivable ways. Among these developing technologies
are artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, “enhanced
humans,” swarming robots, “dense electronic warfare,” and the targeting of individual humans based
upon their “unique electronic and behavioral signatures.”31 Other game-changing, emergent technologies include high-energy lasers, high-power radio
frequency weapons, function-enhancing drugs, automated identification software, radio-frequency identification tags, hypersonic vehicles and munitions,
neural networking, and neural transmitting.32 Moreover, as these technologies are developed and then
adapted for warfare, our potential adversaries’ access
to them through increasingly sophisticated, threedimensional printing capabilities will represent even
more risk for national security planners and warfighters alike.
In sum, the United States is facing a variety of
emerging, complex threats, including those known,
unknown, and unknowable. The accelerating pace of
30. This important point was suggested to me by John Ferrari, MG (USA). Ferrari further suggested that the solutions to
these emerging challenges will not come from our generation,
but, rather, from those who have come of age in our highly connected and technologically advancing world of today.
31. Robert H. Latiff, Future War (New York: Knopf, 2017), 7,
21-37.
32. Latiff, Future War, 21-27.
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technological and sociological change adds further
uncertainty and risk into the national security equation, just as this uncertain situation is exacerbated by
the likelihood of future tight budgets, the continued
rise of revisionist and revanchist powers, and new
threats from increasingly viable nonstate actors. In
this unforgiving environment, we cannot afford to
waste any resources or leave any potential capabilities untapped, and the US Army Reserve can help
solve many of these rising challenges in a cost-effective manner. But before defining and realizing those
important potential contributions, it is important to
make an honest and clear-eyed assessment of the institution as it stands today.
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PART II:
A NEW STUDY
IN
UNPREPAREDNESS
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3. THE ARMY RESERVE’S FIVE “STRUCTURAL”
REALITIES
It was generally agreed that the North Koreans, when
they found out who they were fighting, would turn
around and go back. The young soldiers of Task Force
Smith were quite confident; at this point, none of them
felt fear.
T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in
Unpreparedness, 196333

Over the past few decades, defense planners have
been driven by the necessity to employ most of the US
military’s seven reserve components as operational
reserve forces rather than as the strategic reserves they
were originally intended to be. Army planners continue to lean heavily upon the Army National Guard
and the Army Reserve to bridge the gap between the
ever-increasing requests for land forces and the existing inventory of active component structure. Given
this shift in reserve component missions and capabilities, it is important to make an honest and clear-eyed
assessment of the Army Reserve as it exists today.
This need is particularly acute given the new and complex threats of the twenty-first century as well as the
Army’s goal of realizing multi-domain capabilities
across the spectrum of conflict.
Since 9/11, the Army’s reserve component utilization has run the gamut from combat arms to combat
sustainment, ranging from systematic employment of
the Army National Guard’s brigade combat teams to
similarly expansive use of the Army Reserve’s combat
support formations and other elements needed to
33. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 98.
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open, set, or sustain operational theaters. The Army
Corps of Engineers serves as a representative example
of this increasing reliance on the reserve components.
Almost all of the active component’s engineers are
contained in the brigade engineer battalions of the brigade combat teams, which by structure and doctrine
only provide about 25 percent of the engineer assets
and capabilities required for decisive action operations. Put another way, about 75 percent of the Army’s
combat effects engineering units, and nearly 100 percent of the construction effects units needed to set and
maintain an operational theater, will come from the
Army National Guard and the Army Reserve.
The Army Reserve’s contribution to the Total
Army in other branches and capabilities is equally significant. While the Army Reserve represents just 20
percent of the overall end strength of the Total Army,
at a cost of only 6 percent of the overall Army budget,
the Army cannot be truly expeditionary or sustain
unified land operations for any real duration without
a trained, ready, and resilient Reserve.34 For example,
the Army Reserve contains 83 percent of all military
information support operations structure, 82 percent
of the Army’s total civil affairs capability, 65 percent
of the Army’s quartermaster field services, 50 percent
of all medical capability, and similarly disproportionate percentages of many other critical support and
sustainment enablers.35 The Army Reserve also holds
other specialized operational and functional capabilities that are unique to the component, including
a wide variety of legal, military intelligence, supply,
transportation, engineering, chemical, and military
police structures. The Army Reserve also contains a
34. OCAR, “America’s Army Reserve,” 6.
35. OCAR, “America’s Army Reserve,” 9.
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host of specialized and unique mission command and
theater-enabling capabilities, among them deployable theater engineering, military police, aviation, and
other support and sustainment headquarters. Taken
together, the Army Reserve contains about half of the
Army’s maneuver support structure as well as a quarter of the Army’s force-generating capability.36
In many respects, the binning of these capabilities
in the Army Reserve over the last few decades has represented a smart risk decision, given the circumstances
of their employment over that same period. Likewise,
the predictability and years-long lead times inherent
in the “patch chart” rotational requirements in support
of sustained operations in Iraq and Afghanistan since
9/11 have represented a near-perfect scenario for the
use of Reserve component land forces. Equally important is the fact that these operations have involved
counterinsurgency operations, reconstruction and
stability operations, and detainee operations or security force requirements, rather than high-end, kinetic
operations. Put another way, the specific OEF and OIF
mission sets made the extensive reliance upon reserve
component land forces more feasible and justifiable
from a risk perspective, whether viewed in terms of
risk to mission or risk to force. But we now face the
prospect of the reserve components being called upon
to support combined arms maneuver in unified land
operations against high-end, peer or near-peer adversaries; this shift in potential utilization alters the calculus for reserve use significantly and brings with it
some genuine cause for concern.
By way of analogy, in the early 1990s, most economists described the United States as suffering
from a “structural deficit.” In coining this term, the
36. OCAR, “America’s Army Reserve,” 6.
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economists meant that an entrenched and irresponsible combination of inadequate tax revenues, elevated military spending, and uncapped social welfare
entitlements would prevent the federal budget from
achieving fiscal balance for the foreseeable future. This
adverse situation could not be resolved without fundamental reforms. Unfortunately, the United States
finds itself in this fiscal situation again. And in a sense,
the Army Reserve is in a similar predicament. That is,
the Army Reserve is now in a state of structural unpreparedness—or an enduring and persistent readiness
deficit—when the fundamental realities of the organization are juxtaposed against the emerging demands
of the twenty-first century threat environment and the
emerging needs of the Army described in TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-3-1 and FM 3-0.
Indeed, the five structural realities below must be
understood separately and in combination if we are
to assess the organization’s potential to meet these
emerging requirements honestly and realistically.
Structural Reality #1: Army Reserve soldiers are
required by statute to perform 39 days of training
per year, as advertised.
Army Reserve soldiers are required to perform
39 days of training annually, contrasted with the 365
training days that are theoretically available to active
soldiers. Complicating this limiting factor further,
while the Army Reserve can shift resources internally
to increase an individual soldier’s training days when
needed, the statutory training requirement remains
the baseline of 39 days, and the soldiers were recruited
into the Army Reserve with the central advertising
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message of “one weekend a month, plus two weeks
per year.”
Despite this oft-repeated narrative of the 39-dayper-year commitment, the practical reality is markedly
different. Data compiled by the RFPB in 2014 from the
Defense Manpower Data Center showed that over the
period from 2000 to 2013, Army Reserve officers served
an average of 73 days per year in a compensated duty
status; however, Army Reserve enlisted soldiers spent
an average of 50 days in a compensated status, for an
overall average of 54 days per service member.37 Army
Reserve soldiers serving in leadership positions,
regardless of rank (sergeant and above), served an
average of 74 days in a compensated duty status per
year. Of course, these measures of compensated duty
performance do not reflect the daily, uncompensated
requirements of service in a leadership position. The
RFPB report did not break out the leaders’ uncompensated requirements separately, but these uncompensated requirements averaged 17.3 extra hours per
month for all Army Reserve officers, with enlisted
Army Reserve soldiers averaging 11 hours per month
in uncompensated service themselves.38

37. RFPB, 2014 Reserve Forces Policy Board Annual Report
(Falls Church, VA: RFPB, July 20, 2014), 19, https://rfpb.defense
.gov/Portals/67/Documents/Reports/Annual%20Report/2015%20
RFPB%20Annual%20Report%20Final.pdf.
38. RFPB, 2014 Reserve Forces.
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Structural Reality #2: The overwhelming majority
of Army Reserve soldiers needs full-time civilian
employment to be able to serve.
For traditional, part-time Army Reserve soldiers,
who comprise about 94 percent of the Army Reserve’s
overall structure in our deployable operational units, it
is the soldier’s civilian occupation that “puts the food
on the table.” Put another way, the Army counts on
civilian employers to subsidize our Army Reserve soldiers’ service, so it is incumbent upon us to help them
to maintain their employment so they can continue to
serve. The increase in operational reserve peacetime
readiness requirements in the face of emerging, highend threats over the last few years has begun to strain
the force. When combined with the strong economy,
this strain has manifested itself in the form of challenges in achieving and maintaining Army Reserve
end strength objectives and retaining our soldiers up
to or beyond their first enlistment.
This second Army Reserve reality has adverse
qualitative impacts for the soldiers who do remain
in the force. Specifically, the need for viable civilian
employment results in a self-selection bias that often
makes it difficult to get the most talented junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to commit
to taking on the Army’s most challenging leadership
assignments, especially in the operational units, where
the demands on leaders’ time are the greatest.39 And
given the typical timelines for company command for
officers and squad and platoon leadership for NCOs,
39. Chris Govekar, COL (USA), “The Army Reserve Simply
Doesn’t Have Enough People Willing To Fill Command Slots,”
Task and Purpose, December 26, 2018, https://taskandpurpose.com
/army-reserve-command-slots-shortage.
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it is too often the case that our junior leaders are trying
to establish themselves with young families and civilian careers at the very same time that they reach the
point when the Army needs them to take on leadership roles in uniform.
When you combine each of these elements, the
major factors that most often inhibit Army Reserve
soldiers from performing extra duty are not usually
tied to a lack of Army resources. Instead, it is more
often the case that our soldiers lack available time
to perform the extra duty, or that they are unwilling to commit extra time to the Army in light of the
opportunity costs of that service. From the soldiers’
perspective, these opportunity costs can come in the
form of time away from their families or as unwanted
and unnecessary complications with their civilian
employment. This situation also leads to another selfselection bias, in the sense that the soldiers who are
most willing to sign up for extra duty are too often those
with lesser prospects on the civilian side of the citizensoldier equation. In that situation, the Army Reserve
becomes something of a jobs program, rather than the
application of scarce top-drawer talent against specific
requirements.
Structural Reality #3: Army Reserve human
resources are distributed geographically and structurally across the United States.
In the active component of the US Army, human
resources are managed centrally by Department of
the Army G-1, its subordinate Human Resources
Command, and other staff elements. The active Army
accesses new soldiers centrally, and those soldiers are
fungible—that is, they are relatively easily assigned
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against requirements wherever those requirements
are located. Active soldiers can be moved to those
duty locations on a generally routine schedule, and
they understand that the needs of the Army will ultimately drive their duty assignments.
The reality of the Army Reserve’s human capital
management is quite different. In advance of mobilization, the Army Reserve has a structural distribution
of its human resources. This reality is tied to the fact
that our soldiers are literally volunteers three times
over. That is, they first volunteer to serve in the Army
Reserve, after which they sign up for a military occupational specialty (MOS). Each soldier then joins a particular unit anchored in a specific geographic location.
For most soldiers, the choice of unit—almost always
connected to family and civilian employment considerations—is often the most important of the three acts
of volunteering to the soldier, and the one with the
most emotion connected to it.
The Army Reserve’s lack of a centralized G-1, or
at least a G-1 with any significant ability to redirect
human resources for unit requirements prior to soldier mobilization, represents a major human resources
challenge. The implications of this structural distribution of human capital, which are explored in more
detail in the chapter that follows, are substantial.
Given that Army Reserve installations are essentially
fixed, in the sense that real property acquisition and
divestiture transactions and the corresponding unit
relocations are both expensive and politically charged
actions, the Army Reserve is essentially beholden to
particular locations for recruiting and retaining the
soldiers that comprise our units.
The fact that the economic circumstances of
particular regions change over time adds another
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complication to the goal of building trained and ready
units of action. For example, as recruiting markets
swell or fade, the Army Reserve too often experiences
a wide variation in unit end strength tied to the ability to recruit in particular geographic locations. On
the one hand, some units will be persistently over
their required strength, while others—often derided
as being “broken units”—become habitually understrength. Both cases are problematic in their own
ways, but those that fail to grow become candidates
for the challenging and emotionally charged act of
restationing.
Structural Reality #4: By default, the Army Reserve
lags the active Army in equipment supply, readiness,
modernization, and access.
As another aspect of the binning of risk by component, the Army Reserve’s equipment posture lags
behind that of the active component, whether measured in terms of supply, modernization, readiness, or
access.40 In one sense, the same factors that frame the
structural and geographic distribution of human capital in the Army Reserve apply to the Army Reserve’s
distribution of equipment. However, these persistent
equipment challenges are also partly by design, as the
Army seeks to maximize the benefit to the Total Army
in its application of scarce funding for equipment
acquisition; this is known as a cascading equipping
strategy.

40. Samuel R. Cook, COL (USA), ed., National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2019 (Washington, DC:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, March
2018).
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As part of this deliberate approach, the Army often
intentionally purchases reserve component materiel
at a slower pace than it does materiel for the active
Army. The Army also hands down older equipment to
the reserve components after procuring new versions
for the active force. As a result, the Army Reserve
does not keep pace with the active Army in terms of
fill rates or modernization. In addition, the realities
of the defense budget are such that these equipment
challenges are structural in nature, or persistent and
enduring, at least in the pre-mobilization phase of
Army Reserve training and readiness activities.
As a result of this equipping strategy, most Army
Reserve units do not have a full complement of equipment required by the modification table of organization and equipment or the most modern versions of
many critical items. As a key example, this situation
is particularly acute in the area of mission command
systems. Even those units that have the required communication and computing equipment usually lag in
terms of system patches, updates, and required credentialing. In public remarks in 2015, the Chief of the
Army Reserve estimated that 75 percent of all Army
Reserve mission command systems, including both
hardware and software, were incompatible with their
active Army counterparts.41 Examples include Blue
Force Tracker, the Movement Tracking System, and
Joint Capabilities Release, among other mission command information systems. This equipment story is
the same in many other areas.
41. Michelle Tan, “Reserve Chief: Budget Cuts Affecting Readiness, Modernization,” The Army Times, October 7, 2015, https://www.armytimes.com/your-army/2015/10/07
/reserve-chief-budget-cuts-affecting-readiness-modernization/.
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By definition, then, the Army Reserve is not
interoperable with the active component during routine pre-mobilization training. Army Reserve readiness is inhibited further by the disaggregation of unit
equipment sets and the dispersal of equipment storage sites around the country. Units also face difficulties in gaining access to equipment for training and
maintenance activities. When taken together, these
equipment realities combine to impose a limit on what
is realistically feasible in terms of generating premobilization readiness.
Structural Reality #5: Every mobilizing unit requires
pre-mobilization cross-leveling and postmobilization training.
The Army Reserve’s fifth structural reality logically
flows from the previous four. Regardless of whether
unit mobilization is preplanned in accordance with
the Sustainable Readiness Model (SRM), or instead
emerges as the result of a no-notice contingency, Army
Reserve formations will require a cross-leveling of
personnel upon the notification of sourcing. Given the
Army’s cascading equipping strategy, mobilizing units
are also likely to require a cross-leveling or outright
issuance of equipment, whether to fill shortages or to
provide modernized or updated versions of missioncritical equipment. Invariably, mobilizing units will
also require some level of post-mobilization training,
including training on various individual, leader, and
collective tasks. This fifth structural reality is a simple
fact of life in the Army Reserve.
To substantiate this assertion, each mobilization in
support of OEF, OIF, Guantanamo Bay, and other missions in the post-9/11 period has required personnel
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cross-leveling and post-mobilization training. Most
involved equipment cross-leveling and the fulfillment
of operational needs statements as well. In fact, while
the Army Reserve is justifiably proud of never having
missed a late arrival date during the many years of
extensive mobilizations and deployments, the truth
is that it took a major cross-leveling of personnel and
equipment, extensive post-mobilization training, and
a concurrent infusion of many other resources to sustain that record. Furthermore, the vast majority of
mobilizations in support of OEF, OIF, and other missions during this period were of the preplanned, patch
chart variety, meaning that they were typically projected well in advance of need.
Carrying this theme further, the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model was largely an artificial
construct for the Army Reserve over those years, as
few units—if any—ever actually progressed systematically through the five-year cycle. Instead, commanders and planners typically scrambled during the last
few years of a unit’s ARFORGEN sequence to man and
equip the formations at the levels required to report
to the mobilization platform for post-mobilization
training. The four- or five-year SRM and ARFORGEN
models run up against a variety of reserve realities that
make them impractical in the first place. Among these
inhibitors are two-to-three-year command tenures,
high rates of personnel turnover in units from year
to year, professional military education (PME) schedules that are out of sync with the cyclical models, and
even requirements for senior-grade leaders to transfer
to new units to be promoted. These and other factors
render the models unrealistic at best.
When these five structural realities are considered in the context of the emerging threats and
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requirements of the twenty-first century, it becomes
clear that the Army Reserve’s status quo would present significant risk to mission and force in the event of
a major, short-notice, kinetic conflict. These factors are
only part of the story, however, as our assessment of
the challenges that confront today’s Army Reserve is
not yet complete.
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4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE REALITIES AND
OTHER CHALLENGES
M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day
on which full mobilization commences or is due to
commence.
C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment
operation commences or is to commence.
Joint Publication 5-03.1: Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System42

The contemporary need for an “operational”
reserve coupled with the emergence of potential,
high-end, kinetic threats has resulted in the imposition of increased peacetime readiness requirements
across each of the DoD’s seven reserve components.
Defense planners have also leaned upon the reserve
components to shorten their mobilization and deployment timelines, with the goal of making reserve
capabilities available quickly and routinely to meet
ever-expanding global force requirements. In the case
of the Army Reserve, these heightened peacetime
readiness requirements run squarely up against the
institution’s five structural realities. However, these
structural realities only represent part of the challenge
that confronts Army Reserve leaders in their efforts to
transform the organization into a rapidly responsive
and mission-ready operational component of the US
military.

42. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-03.1: Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (Washington, DC: The Pentagon,
August 4, 1993), GL-47.
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Implications and Challenges: M Cannot Equal C
In its essence, the act of bringing together the
personnel, equipment, training, and effective leaders needed to realize the successful mobilization and
deployment of a reserve unit is a physics problem. That
is, each of these elements must be brought together in
space and time and in a particular sequence to meet
Army and Joint Force requirements, which change
frequently. This challenge is exacerbated by the disaggregated and dynamic nature of the Army Reserve
personnel and equipment that have to be brought
together to form a deployable and mission-ready unit.
Just as Army Reserve units are widely and unevenly
distributed across the United States by type and capability, Army Reserve personnel are unevenly distributed by rank and occupational specialty; the Army
Reserve’s equipment is spread across the United
States as well. These geographic distributions happen
for a variety of reasons, such as the need to be able
to respond to Defense Support to Civil Authorities
requests, the realities of evolving recruitment markets,
and even congressional political calculations.
Training proficiency varies for similar reasons.
Like the ARFORGEN model that came before it, the
SRM is a largely artificial exercise for Army Reserve
formations, given persistent shortages of low-density
soldiers, the juxtaposition of SRM’s four-year sequence
with two- or three-year command tenures, and rates
of turnover in the junior ranks that often run around
20–25 percent of each unit per year. As such, SRM’s
four-year cycle might see a unit turn over nearly 100
percent of its junior personnel in one cycle, with a corresponding requirement for new duty MOS qualification training seats every year. It is also usually the case
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that the leadership that begins the four-year cycle will
not still be in place when the SRM cycle culminates.
In a real sense, the predictability and repetitiveness of
OEF and OIF missions were tailor-made to overcome
these realities. But the hard truth is that M-day—the
date on which Army Reserve forces are mobilized—
cannot equal C-day—the date on which operations
commence—without the forces accepting major operational risks.
Implications and Challenges: Manning the Force
In addition to the structural aspects noted previously, a variety of other factors present major and
persistent obstacles to the task of filling the Army
Reserve’s ranks and retaining soldiers once they join.
One central challenge comes from the fact that the
best recruiting markets change over time, often without warning, while unit locations are essentially fixed,
given the real property, workforce, and political inhibitors connected to the process of relocating units. A
glance at the Army Reserve’s personnel data reveals
a massive turnover of junior enlisted personnel each
year as well as a persistent difficulty in filling the
ranks with the numbers of mid-career leaders needed
to lead the organization effectively. The Army Reserve
compensates for these persistent shortfalls by simultaneously bringing in as many new soldiers as possible
each year and promoting nearly every officer or NCO
who meets the basic educational and training qualifications required for the junior and mid-career ranks.
Unsurprisingly, this approach has resulted in a variety
of adverse consequences, whether viewed quantitatively or qualitatively.
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The most prominent of these adverse consequences
is a persistent distribution of human resources in the
shape of a skinny pyramid, or a hollowing of the officer and NCO ranks in the mid-career grades, with a
concurrent major overstrength in the junior ranks and
a wholesale shortage of warrant officers of all grades.
In fiscal year (FY) 2018, the Army Reserve had only 87
percent of the captains, 71 percent of the majors, and
67 percent of the lieutenant colonels it is required to
have by structure. The Army Reserve also had only 70
percent of the staff sergeants it needs as well as 61 percent of the sergeants first class and 83 percent of the
first sergeants required by structure.43 Overall, the FY
2018 Army Reserve had only 80 percent of the warrant
officers required, a particularly concerning shortfall
given the highly technical capabilities that reside primarily or wholly in the component.
On the other hand, the Army Reserve has about
200 percent of the lieutenants it needs, 107 percent
of the privates required, 128 percent of the specialists needed, and 111 percent of the sergeants required
by structure.44 Furthermore, this skinny pyramid has
been persistent, as a glance at the strength report from
a year earlier in January 2017 shows equally significant shortages, including shortfalls of 607 staff sergeants (73 percent of required fill), 6,643 sergeants first
class (67 percent), 1,109 master sergeants and first sergeants (82 percent), 1,899 captains (84 percent), 4,613
majors (57 percent), and 1,744 lieutenant colonels (69
percent). The force was also short by 707 warrant officer 1’s and chief warrant officer 2’s (CW2s) (71 percent
43. Chief of the Army Reserve, “Weekly Chief of the Army
Reserve’s Cards,” March 2, 2018. The numbers were comparable
six months prior to this data pull as well.
44. Chief of the Army Reserve.
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of required fill), 219 CW3s (80 percent), 47 CW4s (90
percent), and 21 CW5s (75 percent).45
These mismatches between inventory and requirements bring with them all of the adverse implications
one would expect. For example, the Army Reserve’s
readiness posture is adversely affected by the fact that
a majority of the lieutenants—53 percent of the total
population—are actually serving in slots that call for
a captain. Likewise, 52 percent of the Army Reserve’s
captains are serving in majors’ slots, while 73 percent
of majors are serving in positions that actually require
a lieutenant colonel.46 Complicating things further,
Army Reserve soldiers are not fungible like their active
component counterparts, in that soldiers who are in
excess to a need in one geographic location cannot
be easily reassigned to other units where a need for
their rank and MOS exists prior to a unit being mobilized. In the enlisted ranks, this skewed distribution
results in leader-to-led ratios closer to one-to-eight in
many units, rather than the one-to-three or one-to-four
called for by Army doctrine. Junior soldiers fail to get
the leadership or coaching they need, especially when
they are new to the service, and they subsequently
vote with their feet by quitting altogether or fail to
meet the standards for remaining in the service.
Other factors present serious challenges as well.
The Army Reserve’s particular mix of units and specialized capabilities, such as medical units, means that
unlike Components 1 and 2, the Army Reserve actually requires more captains than it does lieutenants
across the force. Accordingly, lateral entry into the
Army Reserve from the active component is a vital
source of officers and NCOs and, when the economy
45. Chief of the Army Reserve.
46. Chief of the Army Reserve.
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is strong or if the active component is growing in size,
the Army Reserve usually has difficulty achieving
its mission. Likewise, nearly all promotions are contingent upon the completion of PME, and it is often
too difficult for Army Reserve officers and NCOs to
juggle PME requirements on top of civilian employment, family obligations, and their ongoing military
responsibilities in their units. Perversely, it is often the
officers and NCOs with the most successful civilian
careers—the exact talent we would like to retain in the
force—who find it too hard to complete their PME.
As an example of this challenge, a lieutenant colonel’s promotion board in recent years had 96 combat
engineer majors eligible for promotion consideration.
Thirty-two of the 96 majors were selected for promotion, while the other 64 were not. All 32 selectees had
completed the required PME, while none of the 64
non-selectees were educationally qualified.47 Simply
put, we know that, within that group, there were
selectees who should not have been selected for promotion, along with non-selectees who should have
been selected. Regardless, the low numbers of selectees do not begin to fill the numerous mid-grade vacancies across the Army Reserve’s formations.48 Since the
Army Reserve has no transient, training, hospital, and
school accounts, and since opportunities for temporary duty and return are extremely limited, this problem will not solve itself.
As a major contributing factor to many Army
Reserve leaders’ inability or unwillingness to complete required leader development training, local
47. Eli Candelaria, CPT (USA), “Lieutenant Colonel’s Promotion Board Results” (speech, Engineer Senior Leader Conference,
Fort Leonard Wood, MO, April 2015).
48. Govekar, “Army Reserve Simply.”
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commanders too often require their subordinates to
attend a unit’s collective training exercise instead of
their PME, or they merely allow the leaders to do so
when asked. These shortsighted decisions based on
rationalizations for the sake of unit-level readiness
“eat the Army’s seed corn” and contribute directly to
a “hollow force” in the mid-career ranks. Across the
Army Reserve, 58 percent of majors do not meet the
military education qualifications for promotion, along
with 30 percent of captains, in populations already
badly understrength.49 A related challenge to PME
completion and mid-career retention comes in the
form of limited oversight of soldier physical training,
as Army Reserve leaders generally only see their soldiers a few days per month. In some cases, soldiers
attempt to mask physical fitness shortfalls by avoiding attendance at institutional training such as PME,
where physical fitness tests are routinely required as a
condition of enrollment.
Similar personnel challenges are evident within the
Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) program as well. As
one causal factor, the Army Reserve often struggles to
meet AGR accession targets, and overall quality suffers accordingly, as the recruiting aperture is opened
as widely as it can be. While systematic empirical evidence of AGR qualitative performance is not available, this selection bias reveals itself to commanders
in a much higher degree of variance in performance
across the AGR ranks than I have found to be the case
in the active component. To be clear, we have truly
excellent AGR soldiers who compare favorably with—
or exceed—the performance of their active component
counterparts. Unit commanders rely heavily upon
49. Tia Young, COL (USA), Army Reserve G-1 (information
paper, October 27, 2016), 1-2.
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these highly talented individuals as the backbone of
their units and staffs. But it is too often the case that
other AGRs fail to perform to the minimum standards
expected of their grades or specialties, a situation that
results in major detrimental effects for their units,
given the pivotal role that AGRs play in realizing
peacetime training and readiness.
In fairness to the AGRs, the Army Reserve generally gives short shrift to their professional development. Little is offered in the way of intentional or
formal, professional development for the AGRs as
a group, as only the functions of “administer, train,
organize, maintain, and mobilize” are authorized.50
The administer, train, organize, maintain, and mobilize law therefore limits the Army Reserve’s ability to
develop AGRs as leaders by preventing AGRs from
being placed into traditional leader development
assignments such as company and battalion commands, except in units tied to those specific functions,
such as recruiting units. At the same time, the Army
Reserve is highly dependent upon its AGRs to serve
in important roles that shape the organization at the
component and Army Reserve command levels, given
the reality of an inverted full-time support (FTS) pyramid. That is, there are major requirements for component-level expertise at the Army staff level as well as
major requirements for command-level staff expertise
in the headquarters that reports directly to US Army
Forces Command. But there is little or no formal training for the AGRs who are assigned to these critically
important roles.
50. Department of the Army, AR 135-18: The Active Guard
Reserve Program (Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Publishing Directorate,
September 29, 2017), 3, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs
/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN5961_AR135_18_WEB_Final.pdf.
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Expanding upon this theme, the Army Reserve’s
operational units are comprised of about 94 percent
part-time personnel on average, while the senior-level
staffs are nearly 100 percent full-time, between AGRs
and Department of the Army civilians. The variance
in AGR performance—coupled with a mismatch
between requirements and the skills represented in
the inventory of senior AGRs and made worse by
generally poor AGR talent management—means that
below-the-line performers or others without requisite experience or expertise are sometimes placed into
key roles at a very senior level. It is also too often the
case that the AGRs assigned to these roles have little
recent experience with the realities on the ground in
the Army Reserve’s operational units. Since readiness
building actually happens at the unit level, any lack
of awareness of the conditions on the ground impedes
senior staff from making optimal policy and resourcing recommendations for a largely part-time force.
As a separate but related manning issue, it is
appropriate to mention the Individual Ready Reserve
(IRR) at this point. The IRR is not part of the Selected
Reserve managed by the Army Reserve; rather, it is
overseen by the Army’s Human Resources Command.
However, the IRR represents a large pool of potential contributors to reserve requirements with diverse
talents and a wide variety of skills acquired in the
civilian and military workforce. At present, the pool
of IRR personnel is largely untapped and unready
for mobilization and deployment. This issue was the
subject of an RFPB study in 2016 that recommended
the implementation of modernized tracking systems,
database systems and management tools, and legislative changes aimed at improving IRR accessibility and
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accountability.51 To place this potential pool of talent
and capacity and its current low level of utilization
into perspective, the size of the Army IRR was 98,861
as of November 2015 and 109,624 as of October 2016.
But although the IRR constitutes approximately 25
percent of the Ready Reserve for all services, as of
2016 it had only accounted for 4 percent of all reserve
mobilizations since 2001.52
Implications and Challenges: Equipping the Force
As a consequence of the Army’s cascading equipping strategy, the Army Reserve systematically lags
the active Army in terms of equipment supply, readiness, modernization, and access. The implications of
this lack of comparably lethal, survivable, maneuverable, sustainable, and interoperable equipment are
particularly concerning in the Army Reserve’s combat
support forces, as it means that the Army Reserve is
not in a position to support high-end, kinetic contingencies without substantial new equipment fielding
and training after mobilization.
Across the Army Reserve generally, the lack of
interoperable mission command equipment regularly
limits the efficiency and effectiveness of the component’s collective training events, whether conducted
in a combined arms setting or not. Units frequently
spend the first several days of any collective training exercise updating systems to reflect the numerous patches, versions, and other routine changes to
the information technology environment. For other
51. Andrew Tilghman, “Bringing the Individual Ready
Reserve into the ‘Total Force,’” The Army Times, October
26,
2015,
https://www.militarytimes.com/2015/10/26
/bringing-the-individual-ready-reserve-into-the-total-force/.
52. RFPB, Improving the Total Force, 20-23.
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systems, there is no equipment to update. The Army
Reserve faces similar challenges given that the cascading equipping strategy also does not provide for unitor installation-connected equipment training sets.
The DoD National Guard and Reserve Equipment
Report for Fiscal Year 2019 places these challenges into
context. For example, the gap between modernization
requirements and actual procurement funding levels
for all DoD reserve components has steadily increased
since FY 2001, from a gap of about $140 billion in FY
2001 to a shortfall of approximately $250 billion in
FY 2018.53 Excluding substitutes, which tend to represent modernization and interoperability shortfalls,
the Army Reserve had equipment shortages representing more than $6 billion in requirements and 19
percent of all equipment required across the component in FY 2017.54 The National Guard and Reserve
Equipment Report also notes “difficult resource prioritization decisions” and a “chronically underfunded
Army Reserve” that has created “compatibility gaps
between critical enabling capabilities required to support maneuver forces,” with “unique capabilities . . .
especially at risk.”55
Implications and Challenges: Training the Force
Billed as “one weekend per month and two weeks
per year,” the 39-day training model is the critical limiting factor in the Army Reserve’s ability to
achieve training proficiency; however, it is not the
53. Samuel R. Cook, COL (USA), ed., National Guard and
Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2019 (Washington, DC:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness, March
2018), 1-1.
54. Cook, Equipment Report, 1-9.
55. Cook, Equipment Report, 1-13.
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only limiting factor. For example, the requirements set
forth in AR 350-1: Army Training and Leader Development are essentially the same regardless of component,
with the exception that a few timelines are extended
for the reserve components to complete some tasks.56
The same is true of the expansive list of congressionally
mandated individual requirements that—if completed according to specification—would consume
most available training time by themselves.57 Thus,
while commanders theoretically have a 39-day baseline upon which to focus and build their training and
readiness-building plans, the reality is something
much different.
Army regulations and commanders’ training guidance at echelon, ranging from US Army Forces Command down to the brigade and battalion levels, are
similarly additive and largely unrealistic when superimposed on the 39-day model. For all the right reasons, TRADOC takes the stance that “the standard is
the standard” for all components, and thus requires
commonality across the Total Army. However, this
stance also limits reserve commanders’ flexibility to
prioritize requirements and renders AR 350-1 essentially infeasible for Components 2 and 3. As the old
saw at the US Army War College goes, “It’s only a lot
of reading if you actually do it.” Reserve component
commanders react similarly to this incongruous ratio
of requirements to time available by quietly ignoring
56. Department of the Army, AR 350-1: Army Training and
Leader Development (Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Publishing Directorate, August 19, 2014), http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/g2Docs
/Foundry/r350_1.pdf.
57. Roland J. Yardley, Dulani Woods, Cesse Cameron Ip,
and Jerry M. Sollinger, General Military Training: Standardization
and Reduction Options (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012),
chapter 4.
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requirements or, in Leonard Wong’s view, by falsely
reporting that they have completed tasks, when in fact
they have not.58
Another inhibitor to training proficiency is the fact
that many reserve component soldiers do not have
the opportunity to participate in their unit’s collective training exercises—known as annual training or
extended combat training—due to the higher-priority
requirement of taking duty MOS-qualifying training
or PME. Additionally, mandatory self-development
courses and the distributed learning phases of MOS
producing and PME schools tax the reserve soldiers’
limited time for military service. While active Army
units can carve out time during the duty day for the
completion of this training, reserve component commanders have no comparable alternative. Although
the Army sets aside funds to compensate reserve soldiers for the completion of some self-study requirements, it is still difficult for reserve soldiers to find the
time to complete the training, given their competing
family, civilian work, and unit obligations. In the same
vein, Army Reserve leaders can only directly observe
their soldiers’ physical readiness activities once or
twice per month. These limitations correlate closely
with the difficulty in getting many soldiers, especially younger ones, to meet the fitness and height–
weight standards required for school enrollment and
attendance.
From a collective training perspective, other training inhibitors result from the Army’s limits on training
resources and the priorities it sets for the use of those
58. Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves:
Dishonesty in the Army Profession (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, February 2015), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles
/pub1250.pdf.
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resources. The brigade combat team is the Army’s
primary unit of action, so it is not surprising (or inappropriate) that the Army’s collective training base is
brigade combat team-centric. The Army Reserve is
comprised almost exclusively of combat support and
combat service support formations, making it difficult to find venues for any combined arms training,
let alone multi-echelon combined arms collective
task training—or the “Super Bowl” of training. Compounding this concern for the Total Army is the fact
that in some branches, 80 percent or more of combat
enablers are located in the reserve components and
will therefore be critical parts of the combined arms
team in the event of a high-end, kinetic fight. Finally,
Army Reserve units that do get these rare opportunities typically get little in the way of formal preparation
beforehand, and thus do not maximize the benefits
from these invaluable training experiences.
The obstacles to Army Reserve training proficiency
extend to materiel limitations as well. The Army’s cascading equipping strategy, coupled with the limited
full-timers available to hang parts or update mission
command systems, translates into a lack of interoperability with mission command equipment or an
inability to keep up with maneuver elements during
training. These challenges mean that reserve component units often spend the early days of exercises just
getting their communications synchronized with the
supported units or signing out equipment from consolidated equipment storage sites and getting that
equipment into working order. When training on their
own, these units often experience other challenges
in the form of direct competition with higher-priority, active component units for access to ranges,
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training areas, or other resources, whether in a premobilization or post-mobilization situation.
When all of these limiting factors are combined,
it is clear that the forthcoming implementation of
Objective-T standards will be a much-needed corrective to inflated self-assessments of training proficiency.
This process will also serve as a forcing function for
much-needed improvements in Army Reserve training management and execution. At the same time, this
implementation should also be bracing, in the sense
that we will finally begin to see ourselves more honestly and objectively, even as Objective-T makes it
clear that higher readiness ratings for Army Reserve
formations in the pre-mobilization period are aspirational at best. For example, a “P” level of training
proficiency requires that a minimum of 65 percent of
required unit leaders and 75 percent of all authorized
soldiers be present; it also requires a 65-percent “go”
rate for all performance measures, a “go” on all critical performance measures, and an 80-percent “go”
rate for leader performance measures, all while an
appropriately challenging and complex operational
environment is being replicated.59 This combination of
variables is simply unattainable prior to mobilization
under the current model of Army Reserve personnel,
equipping, and training systems and processes.
Implications and Challenges: Leading the Force
As a recurring theme, once again the primary limiting factor in achieving effective Army Reserve unit
59. Trent D. Upton, LTC (USA), “Objective-T Reporting
and Mission Command: Complementary or Conflict?” (student
paper, US Army War College, April 1, 2017), 10, https://publications
.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3503.pdf.
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leadership is available time. As previously cited, RFPB
analysis found that Army Reserve leaders of all ranks
(sergeant and above) average about 74 compensated
duty days per year, with many daily uncompensated
requirements as well. Given that it is the soldiers’ civilian employment that pays the bills, it is not surprising that as we apply more pressure to company-level
leader teams, we see more junior leaders vote with
their feet by leaving the Army Reserve altogether.
These trends are observed among first-line leaders
and mid-level leaders, not just in the mid-career ranks.
In a related trend, it is increasingly common to see
Army Reserve officers and senior NCOs refuse assignments to command positions in operating force units
in favor of duty on staffs or in generating force units,
as these settings place less stress upon their families,
their civilian employers, and themselves.
Just as troubling, the soldiers we want to retain
the most are those who are most successful in their
civilian employment as well as those soldiers who
are most motivated to pursue higher education. The
more we place pressure upon our company-level leaders and reduce the flexibility that our junior soldiers
require to complete their civilian and military educational requirements, the more likely we are to lose our
most talented teammates. At the same time, we have
essentially disincentivized service in Army Reserve
leadership positions since our soldiers see basically
the same promotion prospects and compensation
regardless of whether they take on the most challenging responsibilities.
Not surprisingly, this combination of factors has
recently translated into decreasing numbers of lieutenant colonels and colonels seeking battalion and brigade command. Army Reserve leadership has begun

58

to investigate whether this decline is directly connected to increasing peacetime readiness and training
requirements, as the decline in applications for battalion and brigade command have been pronounced
over the last few years.60 Likewise, recent surveys
have confirmed that Reserve soldiers were generally supportive of the increased training and readiness requirements during the prime OIF and OEF
years, but that they are far less enthusiastic about the
recently increased peacetime readiness requirements
that come without the payoff of an actual mobilization
and deployment.
As an added layer to this challenge, the geographic
distribution of Army Reserve personnel by rank and
specialty means that board-selected leadership positions often go unfilled, as there is a geographic component to an individual’s willingness or availability to
serve in branch-specific command positions. This rate
of unfilled vacancies reached about 15 percent of all
lieutenant colonel command opportunities in the most
recent selection board.61 Further inhibitors to effective Army Reserve unit leadership include the skinny
pyramid of comparatively thin mid-career officer and
NCO ranks as well as generally poor training management and execution after more than 15 years of outsourcing training to mobilization stations. It is also a
simple fact that Army Reserve officers and NCOs are
by definition less experienced than their active Army
counterparts.
Last but not least, another major inhibitor to effective unit leadership and Army Reserve mission command comes in the major challenges posed by the
geographic span of control. It is common even at the
60. Govekar, “Army Reserve Simply.”
61. Govekar, “Army Reserve Simply.”
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battalion level for command teams to have to exercise
mission command across multiple states and multiple Army specialties. Distributions of units and locations are highly variable, given that the composition
of battalions, brigades, and division-level commands
is driven by the needs of the Army framed by the
Total Army analysis process, rather than by normal
unit associations and aggregations. For many types of
Army units, the Army’s Component 3 requirements
may be primarily for company- or detachment-level
Army capabilities, rather than the battalion- or brigadelevel units that would ordinarily oversee those
company-level formations. This mismatch then results
in gaps in the Army Reserve’s task organization in
terms of training, readiness, and oversight, with
bottom-heavy and geographically dispersed battalions, brigades, and major subordinate commands.
To place this major challenge into perspective, as
one example, the 416th Theater Engineer Command
that I commanded is comprised of approximately
12,500 soldiers spread across 26 Western states in 175
modular units assigned in 112 Army Reserve Centers. The 3 brigades averaged about 3,500 soldiers,
spread among the 416th’s 13 battalions, 80 companies, and more than 90 small detachments. This distribution works out to an average of 5.3 companies
and 7.1 detachments per widely dispersed battalion, each stretched across multiple state boundaries.
Added to this mix is the fact that the various engineering capabilities represented in the command range
from combat arms (sappers) to combat support (e.g.,
mobility augmentation companies and clearance companies) to combat service support (e.g., construction
companies and technical engineering elements). The
command also includes other units, such as military
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police companies and a chemical battalion with associated chemical companies.
Achieving unit proficiency and personnel fills in a
geographically dispersed command in these circumstances is a difficult task, especially given the tyranny
of distance and the limits on duty days and other
resources. These leader tasks are made even more
challenging when modular headquarters elements are
“unplugged” from their training, readiness, and oversight responsibilities due to their own mobilization
and deployment, resulting in short-term, ad hoc task
reorganizations. These ad hoc arrangements invariably result in outright gaps in training, readiness, and
oversight or overburdened and overwhelmed staybehind elements, with all of the associated, adverse,
second-order effects that one would expect.
Implications and Challenges: Posturing the Force
In an Army Reserve context, posturing the force
includes a wide variety of essential tasks associated
with the force’s component-level and institutional
functions and activities. For example, as a separate
component of the US military, the Army Reserve is
responsible for managing real property and other
infrastructure, including the maintenance, security,
connectivity, and sustainment of more than 1,000
facilities.62 The Army Reserve leadership also manages a separate budget, and the component and command staffs are responsible for enabling access to
training resources and support systems. The Army
Reserve manages the distribution, redistribution, and
62. The author acknowledges Tim Lynch, COL (USA), Vic
Sundquist, COL (USA), and the rest of the Army Reserve Campaign Plan working group for framing these definitions.
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maintenance of all unit equipment, while also stationing units to optimize recruiting, retention, readiness,
and other factors.
Stationing units is both an art and a science. One
major goal is to place units in the recruitment markets that are most vibrant economically—areas where
people are attracted to the civilian employment opportunities required to support and subsidize service in
the Army Reserve and where people have a stronger propensity to serve in the military. Of course, the
economy varies nationally and locally over time, with
corresponding effects on the Army Reserve’s ability to
recruit and retain the quantity and quality of personnel needed to man the force adequately. Furthermore,
these market-connected factors tend to change over
time; thus, the posturing of Army Reserve formations
is something of a multivariate calculus problem, with
an element of economic forecasting.
While the Army Reserve is a wholly federal force,
with no dual status or state-level command constraints,
the stationing of Army Reserve units is still affected
by state and federal political considerations. The need
to be responsive for purposes of Defense Support to
Civil Authorities is a consideration, as is the need to
distribute units by type (and equipment) to make it
feasible to recruit soldiers with wide-ranging interests. All three components of the Army and the other
armed services compete simultaneously for the same
prospective service members, which adds another
wrinkle. The bottom line is that the Army Reserve has
had mixed results with its stationing models, with
more than one leader lamenting that it too often seems
to “shoot behind the duck.” Another major inhibitor
to the agile restationing of Army Reserve units is the
simple fact of real property ownership, as relocating
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incurs transportation costs and costs connected with
the procurement and divestiture of those properties.
Just as the models used to analyze relocation options
tend to be backward-looking rather than forwardlooking, Army Reserve information systems and processes tend to be out-of-date and unwieldy. These
systems run the gamut, including personnel, supply,
equipping, maintenance, training (including individual, leader development, collective, and institutional
mandatory types), building and installation management, mobilization, health readiness, and a host of
others. On a positive note, the Army has worked very
closely with the reserve components in the development of the Integrated Personnel and Pay System–
Army (IPPS-A); the hope is that this system and other
advances in enterprise-level software and systems
will help to mitigate or eliminate some of these major
inhibitors to efficiency and effectiveness.
In sum, the Army Reserve’s bid to be an operational reserve force is hamstrung by a combination of
factors, among them a structural and geographic distribution of human resources, equipping limitations,
and training inhibitors posed by the 39-day model.
When these realities are combined with a Cold Warera structure of authorities and similarly antiquated
mechanisms for mobilization, it is difficult to gain
rapid access to trained and mission-ready forces in
timelines that represent an operational rather than
strategic reserve force. These challenges are not intractable, but to ignore them is to accept major risk to mission and force.

63

5. COMPOUNDING EFFECTS FROM THE SOCIAL
AND FISCAL CONTEXT
The young men of Task Force Smith . . . were a new breed
of American . . . who, not liking the service, had insisted,
with public support, that the Army be made as much like
civilian life and home as possible . . . They had grown fat.
T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in
Unpreparedness, 1963.63

Reforming the Army Reserve to account for its
inherent structural realities is only part of the challenge today, as America itself is changing in ways
that are combining to make the prospects for viable
reform even more daunting. These troubling trends
in America’s broader social and fiscal context present
major obstacles to recruiters for all components of the
US military as they seek to recruit, train, retain, and
sustain the all-volunteer force that is required to meet
America’s national security needs. These trends are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Declining Eligibility to Serve
Not only have American fertility rates fallen to
replacement levels—with immigration today serving
as the primary driver of America’s actual population
growth—but a variety of other factors are contributing
to a major decline in the eligibility of young Americans
to serve in the military.64 To place this declining eligibility into perspective, during the World War II years,
63. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 100.
64. Julia Belluz, “The Historically Low Birthrate,
Explained in Three Charts,” Vox, updated May 15, 2019,
https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2018/5/22/17376536
/fertility-rate-united-states-births-women.
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50 percent of young Americans were eligible to serve
in uniform, but that figure has dropped to 23 percent
today.65 The three-quarters of young Americans who
are disqualified for military service today are ineligible due to a combination of factors, among them obesity, other health problems, criminal offenses, and a
lack of required education.66 A study recently commissioned by Mission: Readiness, an organization of
over 700 retired, senior, US military leaders, found
that, while 29 percent of young Americans have a high
school diploma, no criminal record, and no chronic
health issues, only 17 percent would actually qualify
for military duty. Worse yet, only 13 percent of them
would qualify, be available, and meet the basic, entrylevel, test score requirements for serving.67
Rising Obesity Rates and Other Health Issues
US Army Recruiting Command reports that the
most common reason that disqualifies Americans from
serving in the Army today is obesity, which accounts
for 31 percent of all disqualifying conditions.68 The
average level of physical fitness among young people
in the United States is steadily declining, but especially within the 10 Southern states that produce a
disproportionate percentage of Army recruits. Likewise, adult obesity rates are 35 percent or higher in 5
of these 10 high-producing states. Not surprisingly,
65. Jim Michaels, “Fitness Falters among Southern Army
Recruits,” USA Today, January 11, 2018.
66. Bryan Bender, “Fat, Unhealthy Americans Threaten Trump’s
Defense Surge,” Politico, February 19, 2018, https://www.politico.com
/story/2018/02/19/pentagon-buildup-troop-recruiting-shortage-351365.
67. Meghann Myers, “Study: America’s Obesity Threatens
National Security,” The Army Times, October 29, 2018, 20.
68. Myers,“Study: America’s Obesity,” 20.
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the recruits from these states also experience 28 percent more injuries on average than do recruits from
the fittest states.69 On top of these physical challenges,
these studies also indicate clear evidence of declining
work skills throughout the US population, making
these demographic trends a special concern as the
US military becomes increasingly technologically
sophisticated.70
Unfortunately, the news does not get better when
one examines the health and welfare of those currently serving in uniform. A 2018 RAND study of
18,000 service members from across all branches of
service found that almost 66 percent of all members
are considered to be overweight or obese when measured against body mass index standards. Among
the services, the Army had the largest percentage of
overweight troops at 69.4 percent of all members. The
Army also reported the highest rate of sleep concerns,
with 59.4 percent of all respondents reporting that
they got less sleep than needed and 10.6 percent routinely using some form of sleep-assisting medication.71
Declining and Concentrated Propensity to Serve
The picture is even grimmer when young Americans’ propensity to serve is factored into the equation, as the US Army Human Resources Command’s
analysis shows that of 33 million young Americans
69. Michaels, “Fitness Falters.”
70. Mikhail Zinshteyn, “The Skills Gap: America’s Young
Workers Are Lagging Behind,” Atlantic, February 17, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/02/the-skills
-gap-americas-young-workers-are-lagging-behind/385560/.
71. J.D. Simkins, “A Staggering Number of Troops Are Fat
and Tired, Report Says,” Military.com, October 3, 2018, https://
www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2018/10/03/a
-staggering-number-of-troops-are-fat-and-tired-report-says/.
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of recruiting age, only 136,000—or less than half of 1
percent—meet the basic standards, reach the quality
goals, and have an interest in serving.72 In a similar
recent study, Mission: Readiness found that, while
only 13 percent of 16- to 24-year-olds expressed any
interest in serving in the military in 2016, that number
had fallen to 11 percent just a year later in 2017.73
It is also troubling that as the number of young
Americans who are interested in serving in the US military is in decline, those young people with the propensity to serve are increasingly concentrated in the
same families and states. Between 77 and 86 percent
of new military recruits today have a family member
who has served in the military, with approximately
one-third of them having a parent who has served.74
Part of the issue is a decreasing exposure to the military, as the percentage of eligible young people with
a military veteran for a parent was 40 percent in 1990
but fell to 16 percent by 2014.75 The new recruits also
come disproportionately from the same states or
regions of the country. Ten southern states provided
44 percent of all military recruits in 2013, although the
region only has about 34 percent of America’s 18- to
24-year-olds overall.76
72. Meghann Myers, “Top Recruiter: Just 136,000 Out of
33 Million Young Americans Would Join the Army,” The Army
Times, October 12, 2017, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your
-army/2017/10/12/top-recruiter-just-136000-out-of-33-million-youngamericans-would-join-the-army/.
73. Myers, “Study: America’s Obesity,” 20.
74. Phillip Carter et al., AVF 4.0: The Future of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, March 28, 2017), https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports
/avf-4-0-the-future-of-the-all-volunteer-force.
75. “Semper Fidelis,” Economist, October 28, 2017, 32.
76. Nicole Bauke, “The Ten Least Fit States for Recruiting,”
Army Times, January 29, 2018, 24.
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Once again, the news does not improve when we
examine those who are currently in uniform, as the
inclination to stick with the military after joining it has
also decreased in recent years. Specifically, the average rate of first-term attrition for all components of
the US Army is between 25 to 30 percent.77 The rate of
first-term attrition is even higher in the Army Reserve,
as approximately 50 percent of all Army Reserve
enlistees do not make it to the end of their first enlistment, whether it is due to their being removed for a
failure to meet standards or simply for their failure to
continue to show up for unit training activities, a category labelled as “non-participation.” In light of these
trends, some observers have called into question the
long-term viability of the all-volunteer force.
Uncertain and Uneven Defense Budgets and
Mounting Debt
The US military has enjoyed a temporary spike in
funding as well as a brief reprieve from the major and
adverse effects of sequestration, but these temporary
fiscal improvements seem unlikely to continue much
longer. The Congressional Budget Office projects that
federal budget deficits will exceed $1 trillion each year
beginning in FY 2022 and for the next decade, adding
$11.4 trillion in new debt to an already-burgeoning US
national debt.78 The federal government’s current fiscal
policy is simply unsustainable. As Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen asserted
77. Carter et al., AVF 4.0.
78. “CBO’s Updated Projections Show Deficits Continuing to Climb despite Growing Economy,” Peter G. Peterson
Foundation, May 2, 2019, https://www.pgpf.org/blog/2019/05
/cbos-updated-projections-show-deficits-continuing-to-climb-despite
-growing-economy.
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that America’s rapidly increasing national debt was
the single greatest threat to US national security in the
long term. He and other senior defense policy professionals maintain that same stance today.79 To place the
explosive growth of the federal deficit and debt into
perspective, the United States’ total national debt was
only about $1.4 trillion in real terms in 1980.80 That
sum represented all of the deficit spending needed to
deal with the major national crises of American history, including the Civil War, the Great Depression,
World War II, and others stretching all the way back
to the American Revolution. The modern status quo,
with its toxic mix of major social welfare spending,
large defense outlays, and inadequate tax receipts to
pay for it all, is clearly unsustainable. Future defense
budgets will have to shrink at some point out of sheer
fiscal necessity.
Escalating Personnel Costs
As is true in most businesses or similar enterprises,
personnel costs are the most significant expense,
and the DoD is no exception. The Economist recently
observed that many members of the US military now
“see their service primarily as a way to make a living,
as the soaring cost of recruiting and retaining them
indicates,” likewise noting that personnel costs have
increased by more than 50 percent in real terms since
2001.81 The adverse trends in health and fitness come
79. Sen. David Perdue, “Senator: Rising Debt Is Greatest
National Security Threat. Here’s How To Fix It,” USA Today,
October 5, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2017/10/05
/rising-debt-greatest-national-security-threat-heres-how-fix-it-david
-perdue-column/731452001/.
80. Perdue, “Senator: Rising Debt.”
81. “Semper Fidelis,” Economist, 32.
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with their own associated costs as well. As another
indicator of the increased cost of the Army’s increasingly unfit and overweight soldiers, an Army research
group determined that obese soldiers averaged 13
visits to health care providers in a year, while normalweight soldiers averaged 7 visits.82 As the nation seeks
to tailor the future force to bring national security
costs into alignment with budgetary realities, it should
be noted that the average fully burdened (life cycle)
per-capita cost of an active component member of the
US military in FY 2015 was $370,639, while the average fully burdened cost of a member of a reserve component was $118,359.83
A Growing Disconnection from Civil Society
A host of factors has combined to create a growing
disconnection between the US military and the society
it serves. As one key reason for this growing divide,
fewer Americans now have a relative who has served
in uniform than in the past. One recent study found
that only one-third of young Americans aged 18 to 29
have a close family member who served in the military, down from nearly 60 percent for citizens aged 30
to 49.84 This disconnection is also a result of the simple
fact of physical separation, as post-9/11 security measures and the consolidation of active duty installations
due to base realignment and closure have led to a geographic concentration of active forces in fewer posts,
coupled with the physical separation resulting from
force protection measures and other security concerns. The previously noted trends of the US military
82. Tara Copp, “Study: Obese Soldiers May Be Too Expensive to Keep,” The Army Times, October 29, 2018, 10.
83. RFPB, Improving the Total Force, 77.
84. Carter et al., AVF 4.0.
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becoming a family business and a regionalized one
also contribute to this divide.
The rise of social media has had mixed impacts
for the perception of the military among the public as
well. One adverse aspect of this emerging social phenomenon is that bad news travels fast, whether that
news happens to be true or not. Social media and the
24/7 news cycle frequently combine to highlight bad
news connected with the US military, while much
good news gets lost in the persistent background noise
of daily life in a connected world. In an Army of more
than one million individuals, there will inevitably be
a handful of bad actors. Too often today, however,
the actions of those bad actors “go viral,” giving them
the power to taint the institution, which in turn tamps
down the propensity to serve. Conversely, recruiting messages must now penetrate increasingly dense
background noise, and we know that, although the
public currently holds the US military in high esteem,
history shows that these positive public perceptions
are contingent upon events as they unfold and are
never guaranteed.
One more cause for concern comes in the American public’s increasing willingness to use the military
as an instrument of national power, even as the willingness of most Americans to serve in the military
is in significant decline. This troubling combination
has the potential to increase risk to mission and force
while providing more evidence of a growing divide
between the served and serving. As an indicator of
this trend, there is a growing imbalance today between
the percentage of young people who support the use
of military force and the much smaller percentage of
those same young people who are willing to serve in
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the military themselves.85 In short, it becomes much
easier to call for the use of force when one has “no skin
in the game.”
Reforming the Army Reserve to deal with its inherent structural realities and other weaknesses is a tough
enough prospect in its own right. At the same time,
these troubling social and fiscal trends add additional
layers of difficulty to the challenges that prospective
reformers must overcome. Having defined this complex problem set in detail, we now turn our attention
to identifying potential solutions.

85. Carter et al., AVF 4.0.
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PART III:
REFORMS TO REALIZE THE
ARMY RESERVE’S FULL
POTENTIAL
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6. “QUICK WINS”: NEAR-TERM REFORMS TO
BUILD READINESS
None of them were equipped, trained, or mentally
prepared for combat. For the first time in recent history,
American ground units had been committed during the
initial days of a war; there had been no allies to hold the
line while America prepared.
T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in
Unpreparedness, 1963.86

The US Army Reserve is counted upon to provide
trained, ready, resilient, and well-led soldiers and
units to meet Army and Joint Force requirements,
whether those requirements are cyclical and recurring or contingent and emergent. While some of these
requirements are captured by the Army’s annual
readiness objectives, which specify required readiness levels by capability and capacity per component,
others are tied to combatant command contingency
plans that require the delivery of various capabilities
on designated timelines. Regardless of the various
planners’ mandates and expectations, however, the
truth is that the bulk of the Army Reserve’s important
supplementary and complementary capabilities is currently unready.
Fortunately, there is a set of quick-win reforms
that the Army Reserve can undertake through the
application of existing resources and authorities that
can significantly improve the operational readiness of
the component’s soldiers and units. These readinessbuilding reforms will be especially important for the
units that will be employed in direct support of decisive action in unified land operations and for others
86. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 148.
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that must be ready to mobilize and deploy on short
timelines due to the limited availability of those capabilities in active or Guard force structure. While these
reforms will not solve the Army Reserve’s structural
realities and other related challenges, they certainly
can mitigate their effects.
In essence, these measures will help the component to achieve its best possible pre-mobilization
footing and set the conditions for achieving more
rapid post-mobilization mission readiness. Specifically, these quick-win reforms seek to minimize the
number of post-mobilization organizational and training days required to deliver critical capabilities to the
combatant commands that need them. To realize this
challenging end, the central organizing principle of
these quick wins is a focused effort to realize coherent,
consistent, efficient, and effective mission command
across the whole of the Army Reserve.
The Army Reserve’s Current Contributions, in
Context
The Army Reserve’s contributions to the Total
Army are broad and diverse, and they are especially
deep within some of the Army’s branches and specialties. Some contributions are supplemental, in the sense
that the Army Reserve provides additional capacity
when active component units of the same type are
fully utilized or earmarked for other contingencies.
Other Army Reserve contributions are complementary, meaning that they are unique to Component 3
and must be sourced from the Army Reserve whenever a need for that particular capability arises. The
Army Reserve’s contributions generally fall into four
categories. These include: (1) supplemental combat
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support and combat sustainment support; (2) complementary theater-setting and theater sustainment
support; (3) institutional support and force-generation
capacity; and (4) individual augmentation, whether
“above the line” for elements such as the Department
of the Army staff or “below the line” for active component operational and force-generating units.
In the event of high-end, decisive action operations
or other extended operations across the spectrum of
conflict, the Army will undoubtedly require significant augmentation from the Army Reserve. But there
is also a steady-state demand for Army Reserve capabilities and capacity. Recurring and recent, rotational
Army Reserve mobilizations have included whole
units; tailored, smaller units, such as theater-level,
deployable command posts; “plug-and-play” staff sections; specific capabilities needed to augment task-organized units; and numerous individual augmentees
required to fill particular rank and MOS requirements
in deploying units or staffs.
The key point here is that this diversity of missions and the varied security environments in which
they happen dictate equally varied strategies for premobilization and post-mobilization equipping and
training. For example, units mobilized for decisive
action, or operations requiring lethal, survivable,
maneuverable, sustainable, and interoperable forces,
will obviously require the most modern equipment and a much higher level of pre-mobilization
and post-mobilization equipping and training than
units slated for humanitarian assistance or disaster
relief. The Army Reserve’s current approach to premobilization preparation has largely been one of one
size fits all; however, one size does not—and should
not—fit all.
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Goals of the Near-Term Reforms—The Ends
The central goal of these quick-win reform proposals is to simultaneously maximize the pre-mobilization
readiness of the Army Reserve’s soldiers, leaders,
and units and reduce the amount of time required for
post-mobilization administration, equipping, manning, and training. Viewed through this lens, the
most important measure of a unit’s pre-mobilization
readiness becomes the number of days required for
post-mobilization activities placed within the context
of available resources and a unit’s potential utilization, rather than the current emphasis on snapshots of
the pre-mobilization “C” ratings in unit status reports.
To achieve this end, the Army Reserve must focus on
eliminating wasted time and effort among its soldiers,
leaders, and units by getting everyone to pull together
coherently in a clearly articulated, understood, and
prioritized direction.
Since the Army Reserve’s structural realities will
prevent all but a few units from ever achieving full
deployment readiness prior to mobilization, a second
objective will be to acknowledge and define these
inherent limits. At the same time, these reforms aim
to enable Army Reserve leaders to render honest and
accurate, real-time readiness assessments that clearly
define the “deltas” that drive their units’ inevitable
readiness shortfalls. These honest and accurate status
reports, when coupled with tangible, feasible, and
realistic “fix-it” timelines and resourcing requirements, will help senior defense leaders and planners to
make informed risk assessments. These refined postmobilization wellness plans must also be articulated
separately for permissive or nonpermissive theaters of

80

employment to give planners the fullest sense of the
availability of a particular unit or capability.
Guiding Principles—The Ways
To realize these challenging ends, the central organizing principle of Army Reserve reforms in the near
term will be to focus upon enabling coherent, effective,
and efficient mission command. Achieving this goal
across the Army Reserve will only come about through
three related, enterprise-wide efforts. First, the Army
Reserve must design and implement a focused, prioritized, and pre-packaged approach to leader development designed to improve our leaders’ grasp of
the “art of command.” Just as importantly, the Army
Reserve must also enhance its “science of control”
through the development of streamlined yet robust
mission command systems and products that will simplify the leader task at echelon to optimize leader time
and effort. The third related effort will be to draft and
articulate crystal-clear mission guidance while setting
the conditions for holding leaders accountable for the
results that they achieve. Though daunting in scope,
these vital reforms can certainly be realized within the
limits of current resources and authorities.
It is not overstating the case to assert that these
reforms will require wholesale changes in organizational culture aimed at achieving unity of effort across
the institution. Put directly, this effort will require
getting all Army Reserve personnel to work together
from a common playbook, whether at the highest
echelons of the organization or the lowest. This initiative will also require building a common language,
developing a common sight picture, and incentivizing common priorities across the command, as well
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as holding leaders accountable for tangible and measurable results in the units they lead. Ultimately, by
establishing clearly articulated and well-understood
priorities within a framework of robust and efficient
mission command systems, we will create a culture
of teamwork and accountability that will allow most
problems to be solved at the unit level. Commanders
who have a clear sense of task and purpose, and who
have the freedom of decentralized but disciplined initiative, are exercising genuine mission command.
To achieve this end state, the near-term reforms
aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of mission command across the Army Reserve should
• define the problem for Army Reserve leaders at
all levels through prioritized mission command
products and systems;
• reduce pre-mobilization requirements to their
essence and minimum, including simplifying
the commander’s training guidance to prioritize
the nonnegotiable tasks directly tied to mobilization and deployment readiness;
• enforce leader development and training
requirements ruthlessly and enable leaders to
meet those requirements;
• create and adopt universal mission command
systems and training and readiness guidance,
and then ensure that the same systems and
guidance are taught at each school and used in
each unit;
• minimize the inventing that Army Reserve
leaders must do by standardizing everything
that can be standardized, thus enabling command teams and staff leaders to focus on the
substance and execution of those commonly
understood requirements;
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• emphasize training management and execution
practices in the self-development and institutional training domains and as a key element of
all unit-level leader development programs and
place special emphasis on teaching officers and
NCOs how to plan and execute training events;
• structure all mission command systems and
products, as well as the guidance and templates
for the preparation of counseling and evaluations, with an eye to modelling and incentivizing the desired leader behaviors in the
organization;
• give NCOs ownership of the readiness enterprise at the unit level and systematically enforce
accountability for the results they achieve
through the shaping of guidance for the preparation of counseling and evaluations and the
conduct of promotion boards;
• hold all officers accountable for their achievement of clear, tangible, measurable, feasible,
and collective results within the unit or staff
areas of responsibility that they lead;
• automate everything that it is possible to
automate to reduce demands on staff and
leader time;
• evolve collective and individual training to
embrace the NDS, including deemphasizing
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, and
focus instead on preparing for globally integrated and multi-domain operations in the
pursuit of great-power competition and the
potential for decisive action in support of unified land operations;
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• acknowledge that one size does not fit all in
terms of pre-mobilization and post-mobilization
preparation by unit type;
• open lines of communication between geographically proximate, combined arms units of
all components to enable training and coaching
relationships and partnerships as well as combined arms training opportunities with Components 1 and 2;
• redefine the Army’s approach to the unit status
report as a measure of Army Reserve readiness
by deemphasizing the “C” rating and, instead,
emphasizing the identification of specific unit
shortfalls in personnel, supplies, readiness, and
training and the corresponding, specific fix-it
plans tied to scenarios for use;
• enable units to define their readiness gaps in
personnel, equipment, and training resources
and identify potential bridging solutions while
facilitating the articulation of those gaps and
plans to planners and decision-makers up the
chain of command (this process should be automated wherever possible);
• achieve gains in pre-mobilization predictability,
efficiency, and effectiveness within the limits of
resourcing and existing authorities;
• emphasize the retention of all personnel by
enticing more Americans to serve while increasing the satisfaction of those serving and enabling
them to meet the service standards;
• tailor soldier and unit pre-mobilization training
and readiness-building activities to the Army’s
mission requirements while treating the Army
Reserve leader task as the time management
and prioritization problem that it truly is;
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• acknowledge that full-time employment subsidizes Army Reserve service and enable civilian
employment by focusing soldiers on the essential requirements for maintaining a balance
between Army Reserve service and civilian
employment and family obligations; and
• acknowledge that the quality of soldiers’ experience while in uniform directly affects their decision to stay or leave and make the improvement
of the quality of their experience a high-priority
institutional goal.
The Near-Term Reform Recommendations—
The Means
Though the following list is not intended to be
exhaustive, it contains illustrative examples of key,
quick-win reforms that can help the Army Reserve
improve its leaders’ exercise of mission command.
These quick wins can be realized within the current limits of peacetime authorities and resources
and inside the framework of guiding principles set
forth above.
Leader Development and the Art of Command
• Mandate leader development program training
across the Army Reserve for unit status reports;
troop-leading procedures; training management; the resourcing and preparation of training; training execution; Objective-T standards;
the use of training and evaluation outlines; and
Army Reserve mission command products, systems, and priorities. Synchronize these topics in
the schoolhouse and at the unit level.
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• Perform honest, accurate, and substantive
leader evaluations tied directly to the critical
tasks of identifying, developing, and promoting competent and effective leaders at all echelons through the implementation of a first-line
leader/mid-level leader engagement plan. This
policy will specify command special interest
items that must be addressed directly in periodic counseling and in the content of all evaluations. Once implemented, the first-line leader/
mid-level leader engagement plan will help to
model desired behaviors for junior and midcareer leaders, identify readiness requirements
common to all organizations, and hold leaders at all echelons accountable for tangible and
measurable results. The first-line leader/midlevel leader policy should establish common
requirements for counseling, set standards for
preparing evaluations, require monthly contact
between battle assemblies, and define command
special interest items tied to specific training
and readiness tasks. The required tasks should
include individual and crew-served weapons
qualifications; health and dental readiness;
physical readiness and height/weight compliance; duty MOS qualification; the completion of
officer and NCO PME and leader development
programs; and other critical training, readiness, and leadership requirements common
to the force.
• Create and disseminate pre-printed, fill-in-theblank counseling templates with requirements
and standards as the basis for the accountability
of all soldiers at all echelons. Again, the goals
are to simplify and clarify the leader tasks and
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model the desired leader behaviors across all
formations.
• Establish an Army Reserve–wide “Commander’s Top 10,” or a set of generally enduring priorities and institutional objectives that combine
to express an unmistakable commander’s intent,
applicable at all echelons of the organization.
Use this Commander’s Top 10 as the foundation
for all training- and readiness-connected activities and as a means of defining Army Reserve
priorities and creating leader accountability.
Mission Command Systems and the Science of Control
• Create a standardized Army Reserve playbook
that tracks the status of training, readiness,
resilience, and leadership in all units at echelon to create a common operating picture for
all formations, from detachment to major subordinate command. In addition to making it as
fully automated as possible, this common operating picture playbook should be available as a
monthly product that draws directly from the
various databases of record and reveal 6-month
and 12-month readiness trends to provide unit
and staff leaders with a clear understanding of
where they stand with respect to the commander’s highest-priority measures of performance
and measures of effectiveness. In essence, the
common operating picture playbook should
correspond to the four primary LOEs at the unit
level, including: (1) the execution of assigned
mobilization missions and high-priority, collective training events; (2) the status of the
assignment, development, assessment, and
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promotion of leaders throughout the organic
units; (3) aggregated measures of individual
soldier training, readiness, and resilience; and
(4) the status of the planning, resourcing, execution, and assessment of collective training.
In essence, this mission command system will
operationalize the Army Reserve’s priorities
for these critical unit activities at the tactical
level to establish common priorities and get all
teammates to pull together in a common direction. This system will also serve as a checklist
of requirements to inform and focus leaders
and establish a direct means of leader accountability. Once implemented, leaders at all levels
can then go anywhere in the Army Reserve;
ask the same questions about the same priorities; speak the same language; and assess the
same performance standards to discuss leader
and unit performance objectively, candidly, and
substantively.
• Create an automated staff battle book with
the goals of tracking, teaching, and enabling
accountability in staff areas of responsibility.
Consistent with recent SecArmy and CSA guidance to stop asking down-echelon commands
to provide information that is available via
databases of record and other reporting mechanisms, a universal staff battle book that automatically creates detailed, unit-by-unit statuses
and yields corresponding analysis of a unit’s
high-priority shortfalls will focus and empower
staff leaders and enable mission command.
• Create automated task organization books
that include the names and assignments of all
assigned unit personnel with corresponding,
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bulletized lists of the key roles and responsibilities for each element within like types of
units. These leadership and training aids, which
should include the key functions, products, and
tasks of each section of the unit, will serve as
a teaching and coaching tool as well as an aid
to facilitating smooth transitions and turnover.
Given the high rates of turnover in almost every
Army Reserve unit, the soldiers in most formations do not fully understand how teams fit
together as a whole or, in some cases, what their
own roles are on their teams. This issue is often
even more challenging at echelons above the
company level.
• Create mobilization and deployment checklists with versions that correspond to permissive and nonpermissive security environments
to teach leaders what the priorities are for all
aspects of unit readiness generation. Tie these
checklists to unit status report assessments,
including pre-mobilization support requirements such as mobilization platforms, facilities,
validation, and other aspects of force projection
and deployability.
• Establish similar templates for the preparation
of individual or small-section mobilization
augmentees; cross-leveling requirements; rear
detachment operations; and other recurring,
pre- and post-mobilization requirements.
• Standardize expectations and deliverables for
Army Reserve liaisons to our supported Army
Service Component Commands and other partners and stakeholders.
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Mission Guidance and Accountability Mechanisms
• Standardize yearly training briefings, mission essential task lists, and other mission and
training guidance by capability and unit type.
Again, the goal is to use these standardized mission essential task lists coupled with a standardized framework for yearly training briefings,
including a staff assistance visit template and a
framework for readiness reviews, to streamline
leader tasks and focus them on the substance
of unit training and readiness plans, rather
than having leaders find their own way on the
first-order questions.
• Streamline and shorten the US Army Reserve
Command’s command training guidance and
focus it on the essence of pre-mobilization and
leader development requirements and the prioritization of those requirements. Most seniorlevel command training guidances cover all
of the bases and, in doing so, never get read
by unit-level leaders. The command training
guidance should be treated as an Execution
Order, with directives for executing prioritized
red, amber, and green training and readiness
events, consistent with AR 350-1. Key topics
in the revised command training guidance
should include
◦◦ a short list of key references;
◦◦ the purpose—trained, ready, resilient, and
well-led soldiers, leaders, and units;
◦◦ green, amber, and red events by required
participation levels and rescheduled training category;
◦◦ definition of the LOEs in prioritized order;
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•

•

•

•

◦◦ defined annual training, extended combat
training, and PME priorities by order of
merit list, from duty MOS qualification to
PME, then unit annual training/extended
combat training, along with a waiver process for exceptions and approval authorities;
◦◦ specified Army war tasks and battle drills;
◦◦ civilian and military technician training;
◦◦ the specifications and limits for adventure
training, or a soldier satisfaction initiative
aimed at retaining our personnel; and
◦◦ coordinating instructions, including any
other DoD- or Army-specified, command-wide, priority requirements.
Preapprove yearly training briefing and annual
readiness huddle workshop packages within
prescribed cost and procedural limits to enable
these critically important readiness-building
activities to happen routinely and save the staffs
and leadership from the bandwidth-consuming requirement to construct packets for each
activity for senior-level review. Consider a similar approach to facilitating monthly or quarterly senior leader forums for the same reasons
and purpose.
Specify the minimum slate of Army war tasks
and battle drills to be drilled and validated each
year by unit type to enhance soldier and unit
lethality and survivability.
Identify donor unit relationships for all units’
required personnel and equipment cross-levels
and align mission command and task organization in support of this wherever feasible.
Arrange for unit training partnerships between
identified donor units so that teams train
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together in the pre-mobilization period wherever and whenever possible.
• Fill faster response units to 125 percent so
that they are ready for rapid mobilization and
require very limited post-mobilization training and personnel fills. These units will also
receive priority for equipment fills; Combat
Training Center (CTC) rotations; or other comparable, “Super Bowl-type” training opportunities as appropriate to the particular type of
unit capability.
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7. “HEAVY LIFTS”: ALIGNING INSTITUTION
AND MODERN REALITIES
Army Strategic Readiness focuses on the readiness of
the Army as an institution to provide sufficient, capable
units to support the National Military Strategy . . . Army
senior leaders can mitigate or eliminate Army strategic
shortfalls by changes in policy, strategy adjustments, or
other actions.
AR 525-20: Army Strategic Readiness, June 3, 2014.87

We now turn our attention to framing the “heavy
lifts,” or more far-reaching changes to the Army
Reserve as an institution aimed at setting the conditions for achieving strategic readiness—or enhanced
future readiness—in the years to come. While the single-minded focus of the quick-win reforms is to maximize the Army Reserve’s operational readiness in
the near term, defined by Army regulation as the next
two years, these more profound reforms aim at future
readiness, defined as the period two to six years from
now.88 The guiding principles that framed the quick
wins still apply here, as the heavy lifts represent a
follow-on phase of major reforms that build upon the
efforts in the near term. In their essence, these reforms
aim to adapt the Army Reserve to emerging societal
and fiscal trends while simultaneously accounting for
the institution’s known structural realities, the implications of those realities, and the other challenges
described in preceding chapters.
87. Department of the Army, AR 525-30: Army Strategic Readiness (Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Publishing Directorate, June 3, 2014),
2, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/r525_30
.pdf.
88. AR 525-30.
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Army Strategic Readiness through an Army
Reserve Lens
Adopted as Army policy in 2014, the Army Strategic Readiness program is designed to provide a
common framework for understanding and cohering Total Army efforts to build readiness across all
elements of the Army enterprise in direct support of
the National Military Strategy. The Army Strategic
Readiness framework identifies strategic levers available to Army leaders to mitigate readiness shortfalls,
both in the near term and in future years, as well as an
array of leading indicators of those shortfalls.89 Taken
together, the strategic readiness regulation’s tenets,
indicators, levers, reporting requirements, and assignments of responsibility establish a decision support
framework and a process for bringing together policy
choices, strategy adjustments, resource allocations,
and other required actions that will enable the institution to build readiness systematically in the near term
and in future years.
To organize these elements, Army Strategic Readiness divides the readiness-building efforts into six
strategic tenets or bins of activities, including manning, training, capabilities and capacities, equipping,
sustaining, and installations.90 Without question,
the changes in America’s social and fiscal context
described above will present major challenges for
each of the components of the US military as they
seek to build strategic readiness, whether in the near
term or the out-years. At the same time, however, the
challenges that face the Army Reserve are even more
pronounced, as the component must grapple with an
89. AR 525-30, 2.
90. AR 525-30, 6.
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additional set of readiness inhibitors that cut across
each of the strategic readiness tenets.
Chief among the Army Reserve’s additional strategic readiness challenges are its structural realities,
first detailed in chapter 3. Any efforts to build strategic readiness in the Army Reserve necessarily must
account for the realities of being generally funded
for 39 days of duty per soldier per year, with corresponding soldier expectations in line with that level of
commitment. The limited training days and resulting
modest compensation also mean that the great majority of part-time Army Reserve soldiers must obtain
and maintain full-time civilian employment in order
to be able to serve. Unit-level strategic readiness is
also constrained by the Army Reserve’s structural and
geographic distribution of human resources, limiting
the fungibility of human capital prior to mobilization.
Similarly, the Army’s cascading equipping strategy
limits the supply, readiness, and modernization of the
Army Reserve’s unit equipment, just as the structural
distribution of the equipment on-hand limits access
to unit equipment for training and maintenance purposes. These institutional and structural constraints
mean that every mobilizing unit will require a pre-mobilization cross-leveling of personnel and equipment
as well as post-mobilization training, including individual, leader development, and collective training,
and other administrative and logistical support.
Simply put, we cannot spend our way out of these
difficulties; instead, we must think our way through
them. The profound challenges posed by emerging
fiscal and social trends coupled with the underlying
realities of the institution will require equally profound changes to the way we do business if we are to
achieve the strategic readiness that the nation needs.
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Ten Heavy Lifts—Major Institutional Reform
Recommendations
The central goal of each of these reforms is to
help the Army Reserve to realize strategic readiness,
building upon the near-term readiness initiatives outlined in chapter 6. These ambitious reforms are also
intended to set the conditions for the Army Reserve
to become a self-correcting and learning organization, or one that continually self-assesses and adapts
itself to changing circumstances habitually and holistically, rather than one that moves in fits and starts
with a lack of consistent or coherent effort. Each of
these reforms calls upon the Army Reserve to create or
modify Army Reserve structures, systems, processes,
guidance, and priorities to adapt the institution in fundamental ways. These reforms represent heavy lifts, in
that each will require significant commitments from
leaders and staff to the analysis and socialization of
alternatives, along with corresponding policy changes
and—in many cases—legislative change proposals to
bring them about. These aggressive and far-reaching
reforms will require the support of Army leadership
and Capitol Hill.
1. Create and implement an Army Reserve Strategic Readiness Campaign Plan to achieve prioritization, coherence,
and accountability across the Army Reserve enterprise.
From a broader institutional perspective, this
heavy lift is the centerpiece of the effort to reshape
the Army Reserve’s business practices to build strategic readiness systematically and coherently over
time. The campaign plan should logically flow from
the Army Reserve’s authorities and responsibilities
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outlined in 10 U.S.C. 3038, 10102, and 10171, as well
as Headquarters, Department of the Army General
Orders 2011-02 and 2017-01.91 The Army Reserve Campaign Plan should also be nested within the Army
Plan, especially the Army Strategic Plan and the Army
Campaign Plan. While the campaign plan will focus
on enduring requirements tied to statutory requirements, it will also serve as a mechanism for reflecting
and realizing the priorities of the CSA and the Chief of
the Army Reserve.
As a positive first step, the Office of the Chief,
Army Reserve, has recently taken preliminary steps
to develop such a plan, with the proposed LOE generally oriented on the six tenets outlined in the Army
Strategic Readiness regulation. Given the particular
challenges of the Army Reserve’s mission and circumstances, it will also be appropriate to broaden
the strategic readiness framework to capture the critical activities of mobilization, communications (internal and external), and mission command when the
LOEs that frame the campaign are ultimately selected.
Likewise, each LOE will need to include the specific,
major objectives that will fall within its purview, most
of them enduring in nature, as well as the primary
and supporting offices of responsibility and the general officer or senior executive who will oversee them
within each LOE.
Given the many dozens of Army-level and Forces
Command processes at work within the component
and the command, this campaign plan will serve as
the framework for capturing and prioritizing competing requirements across the enterprise in an uncertain
91. Tim Lynch, COL (USA), and Vic Sundquist, COL (USA),
served as the action leads for our year-long effort to build and
socialize a working model for an Army Reserve Campaign Plan.
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fiscal climate. In addition, it will shape the allocation
of scarce human resources. Furthermore, it will serve
as the mechanism for operationalizing the other major
institutional reform initiatives detailed below, as well
as the quick wins outlined previously.
2. Review, realign, and develop the Army Reserve’s component and command staffs, with a particular focus on
establishing formal staff professional development, clarity
of purpose, clean lines of authority, and accountability for
results.
In close parallel with the creation of the Army
Reserve Strategic Readiness Campaign Plan, the Army
Reserve should also undertake a comprehensive
review, reallocation, and restructuring of the human
resources currently assigned to its component and
command staffs. This heavy lift should also encompass
a focused effort to develop the members of these two
staffs professionally through the creation and implementation of staff development programs tailored to
each staff’s particular responsibilities and reporting
relationships.
In recent years, the Army Reserve has oscillated
between the “one staff, two locations” and “two staffs,
two locations” staffing models. Successive Chiefs of
the Army Reserve have sought to solve the persistent,
twin problems of the integration and synchronization
of the component and command staff functions and to
provide adequate staff coverage in both the Department of the Army staff and Forces Command settings
in a time of repeated management headquarters staff
reduction directives. On a positive note, the foundational steps to lay the groundwork for this effort
are underway now in the form of an extensive and
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thorough manpower study led by the Force Management section of the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve,
with input from the component and command staffs.92
The Army Reserve is leveraging this effort as part of
its plan to execute the staff reform directive issued by
the SecArmy in 2018.
In far too many cases, personnel newly assigned to
the two staffs find themselves on their own in terms of
figuring out their new responsibilities. Likewise, very
few of the newly assigned personnel have any significant Pentagon experience or a basic understanding of
Pentagon processes or the networks of relationships
that are critical to achieving effective staffing outcomes inside the building. Furthermore, the Office of
the Chief, Army Reserve and US Army Reserve Command staff lines of authority and responsibility are not
clear in all cases; both staffs have significant gaps in
some critical staff functionality, and still other legacy
programs are not tied directly to building strategic
readiness. The staff development programs should
orient the newly assigned personnel to the human and
physical terrain and train the new action officers and
NCOs on basic staff functions, such as writing effective information papers, navigating the Task Management Tool, and coordinating staff effectively, among
many other important skills.

92. Jeff Abel, COL (USA) and Tony Callandrillo, LTC (USA),
of OCAR, Force Management, served as the action leads for our
ongoing effort to frame the statutory and policy-driven staff
requirements and complete the related manpower studies. This
effort is named, “Component and Command Functions and Staff
Review.”
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3. Realize significant improvements in talent management.
A Government Accountability Office report of
2015 found that the Army Reserve and other reserve
components suffer from significant shortfalls in the
basic areas of assessing and tracking soldier availability, health readiness, deployability, and a variety of
other key types of important human resources data.93
Not surprisingly, these systemic shortfalls extend to
the Army Reserve’s talent management practices and
processes as well. A major contributor to this disjointedness comes in the form of fragmented legacy human
resources and feeder data management systems, as
by one count in 2013 there were 96 separate systems
requiring some type of input.94 Worse yet, most of
these systems require input from the most junior civilian employees at the unit level—positions that generally offer a low income and suffer from high rates
of turnover.
Some of these infrastructure issues have been
addressed over the last few years, and others should
be resolved through the implementation of IPPS-A,
which is underway now. But the category of talent
management is a broad one, and major challenges
remain across the Army Reserve’s human capital
enterprise. Significant examples of challenged areas
include the lack of incentives to encourage Army
Reserve officers and NCOs to take on operational
93. Government Accountability Office (GAO), Army Reserve
Components: Improvements Needed to Data Quality and Management
Procedures to Better Report Soldier Availability, Report GAO-15-626
(Washington, DC: GAO, July 2015).
94. This inventory of information technology systems was
taken by Tim Williams, BG (USA Retired), in 2013 while he commanded the 302nd Maneuver Enhancement Brigade, 412th Theater Engineer Command.
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command assignments, the fact that most Army
Reserve director-level hiring is not nominative, and
the basic inability to tap into civilian-acquired talent to
refine or overhaul outdated human resources management systems and practices, among others.
To get our arms around these and other talent management challenges, it will be appropriate to solicit
interest Reserve-wide for participation in the tiger
teams needed to undertake this heavy lift. The primary
goal will be to bring together the expertise, stakeholders, and authorities needed to guide, improve, and
enforce enhanced accession, assignment, evaluation,
and board processes. Given the trends of declining eligibility and propensity to serve in American society, it
is also time to consider increasing our Army Reserve
soldiers’ flexibility by authorizing the lengthening of
time-in-grade timelines in certain circumstances and
potentially removing the up-or-out system that has
been in place since the passage of the Defense Officer
Personnel Management Act of 1980. This approach
was clearly appropriate in the post–Vietnam War era,
but it may no longer fit well with the modern circumstances of declining eligibility and propensity to serve.
4. Review and revamp AGR accessions, leader development, utilization, and program flexibility.
The AGR program is an extremely important element of the Army Reserve human capital enterprise
which comes with its own issues, challenges, and circumstances. Accordingly, the AGR program deserves
special attention. The primary recommendation here
is to undertake a thorough and inclusive review of
the program, with special emphasis on several major
issues that should be studied carefully and potential
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reforms that should be assessed. The Army Reserve
generally does a poor job of managing the talent in the
AGR ranks, just as it struggles to connect the seniorlevel population of AGRs to the actual needs of the
Army. For example, AGR promotions are not driven
by the “needs of the Army Reserve”; rather, they are
essentially branch-agnostic, with overall merit as the
main criterion. While this approach is certainly fair on
its face, it results in persistent mismatches between the
inventory of officers and NCOs in particular branches
and functional areas and actual mission requirements.
To elaborate, these excess senior officers are often
excess to need, resulting in the Army paying for senior
leadership that it does not want or need and having
to find places to assign the excess officers and the
means to fill gaps in other requirements. An alternative approach would be to tie AGR promotions more
closely to the Army’s needs by branch and functional
area, as is the case with troop program unit (TPU) colonel promotions, which are tied to particular vacancies.
The Army Reserve would then make up the inevitable
periodic branch or functional area shortfalls by utilizing TPU talent to bridge those gaps with more costeffective, short (one- to three-year), active-duty tours.
From a talent management perspective, this approach
would present opportunities to maximize the talent
in critical or nominative assignments and create additional broadening experiences for the top performers
in the officer and NCO corps.
With respect to the task of establishing the AGR
structure throughout the force, current policy allows
for the creation of temporary manpower authorizations to assign AGRs against temporary or emergent
requirements, often without the requirement to identify any corresponding bill-paying billet. Since the
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process of modifying the actual FTS structure is generally lengthy and unwieldy, the temporary manpower
authorizations often remain in place for years without
any corresponding scrutiny of the validity of the original requirement or effort to balance or prioritize the
requirement among competing demands. Taking this
idea further, the Army Reserve would benefit from a
serious and rigorous analysis of the relative impacts
of FTS in different roles as they contribute to the generation of near-term and future-year readiness, in conjunction with a review and restructuring of the overall
FTS authorizations and their distribution to optimize
those impacts. Ideally, this process would be continual
and self-correcting over time.
There are other aspects of the AGR program that
should undergo a contemporary review as well. For
example, it may be appropriate to take a fresh look at
the policy change of 2004 that removed the requirement to selectively continue AGRs beyond 20 years
of active service (the “continuation waiver”) and that
protects the AGRs’ ability to reach the 20-year threshold of service, as is the case in the current program
framework. The goal here would be to ensure that the
best-qualified officers and NCOs continue beyond 20
years of service and to tailor those continuations to the
actual needs of the force.95 The 2004 policy shift certainly made sense in the circumstances of the ramp-up
for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the policy
should be revisited and updated as needed to fit
today’s circumstances.
In the same way, the Army Reserve should take
a hard look at the general lack of coherence in AGR
career management and professional development
practices, including the limitations on AGR eligibility
95. AR 135-18.
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for command and senior enlisted advisor billets. As
part of this review, it will be necessary to consider revisions to the administer, train, organize, maintain, and
mobilize model and the law that prescribes it in order
to permit more robust professional development and
the direct allocation of scarce FTS resources against
high-priority readiness challenges and requirements.
At the same time, the Army Reserve should review
the current roles and practices of the Army Reserve
Proponent Advisor program as well as the relatively
thin oversight of senior AGR assignments that is currently the norm. The Army Reserve should also find
ways to leverage its TPU talent more fully by advertising opportunities on the component and command
staffs and boarding them, with the goal of ensuring
that the best of the best—whether AGR or TPU—fill
these critical billets.
5. Update, revamp, and realign the Army Reserve training
base to focus on combined arms and decisive action training, and to help those with the propensity to serve be able to
stay in uniform.
In many respects, the current Army Reserve training base still reflects the specific needs of the ARFORGEN Army of OEF and OIF. The current Combat
Support Training program is still geared toward
achieving high rotational rates of production at relatively modest levels of combat support proficiency in
the expectation that a more robust training regimen for
sourced units will be implemented post-mobilization.
It is also hard to make the case that these training programs have fully made the jump to decisive action operations from the previous focus on
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counterinsurgency when there are no combat-arms
forces actually present for any of the training, except
in isolated cases.
Just as concerning, the Army Reserve training base
currently places no extra emphasis on soldier fitness,
wellness, or resilience. Again, the status quo seems
to reflect the needs and circumstances of the OEF
and OIF rotational force, in which a soldier could be
retained (and deployed) regardless of whether he or
she met the Army’s height and weight or physical
fitness standards, as long as the soldier is physically
able to deploy. Given societal trends, including the
rising rates of obesity and the declining propensity to
serve, the Army Reserve has little margin for error in
terms of fully utilizing the human capital it has in the
ranks. Fitness, resilience, and healthy living need to
be a key part of our training and educational activities to keep as many of our soldiers in the ranks as
we possibly can.
With these two ideas in mind, the Army Reserve
should undertake a serious and comprehensive
review of the goals and structure of its training base
in the post-ARFORGEN era. In particular, the Army
Reserve should realign capacity to undertake the special, contemporary challenges it faces in the areas of
mission command and leader development, combined
arms training, and fitness, nutrition, and resilience.
The Army Reserve should also examine the coherence
of its civilian workforce training and development
and perhaps consider taking a center of excellence
approach to this critical activity.
Other aspects of this domain merit serious reconsideration as well. For example, the SecArmy and the
CSA have issued recent guidance intended to increase
the force’s focus on lethality and interoperability,
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consistent with the 2018 NDS, while reducing the
administrative and mandatory training burdens on
unit-level leaders.96 These promising developments
are likely to be insufficient from a reserve component
perspective, however, and there may be room to provide reserve component leaders additional authority
to accept risk in other mandatory requirements to
make room for combat training.
With the goal of setting the conditions to retain
every talented and capable soldier we can, the Army
Reserve should also explore potential alternatives that
are further outside the box. For example, to address
the issues of obesity and the general lack of physical fitness and nutritional education and awareness
directly, the Army Reserve could consider establishing a health and fitness center at an Army Reserve
training installation that would serve as a last-ditch
effort to help soldiers meet the standards before giving
up on them and separating them from the force. The
Army Reserve should also explore creating multiple means of achieving PME requirements, including PME sabbaticals and in-house transient, training,
hospital, and school.
The Army Reserve should reconsider the role of
soldier compensation within this domain as well. For
example, the Army Reserve can consider incentivizing
readiness compliance through some form of formal
or informal compensation, paying for soldiers’ offduty work to maintain readiness and recouping that
compensation when soldiers fall out of compliance.
The Army Reserve should also consider compensating those officers and NCOs who step up to take
96. Army Directive 2018-07, Prioritizing Efforts—Readiness and
Lethality (Washington, DC: Department of the Army Chief Information Officer, April 13, 2018).
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on difficult leadership roles, such as the command
responsibility pay that was authorized by Congress
at one point but never used or funded. Informal compensation for command responsibility could include
establishing board guidance that emphasizes successful command of operational (modification table
of organization and equipment) units as a major discriminator in promotion decisions and, thus, a form of
compensation that does not require funding.
Of course, some of these ideas may prove infeasible or undesirable after careful consideration, and
others may require additional authorities or resources.
Others may be feasible through the reprogramming or
reallocation of existing resources or by applying existing authorities in new ways. In any case, it is time for
the Army Reserve to make a serious effort to match its
training and educational activities with its emerging
missions, the makeup and needs of the current force,
and the realities of the society from which we draw
our soldiers.
6. Establish an Army Reserve “CTC Lite” to create routine combined arms training opportunities, foster combined arms training relationships, and give average Army
Reserve units an opportunity to play in the “Super Bowl.”
As an extension of the heavy lift of a comprehensive review and updating of the Army Reserve
training base and as an idea that promises multiple
potential benefits, the Army Reserve should work
to establish an in-house “CTC Lite,” or a scaled and
tailored version of a CTC. With the underutilized
or unused training resources of Fort Knox in mind,
including the mission command training facility there,
this initiative would seek to meet three needs at once
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as it would provide a venue for focused missioncommand training, could facilitate the development
of combined arms training relationships with active
Army and National Guard combat-arms formations,
and would give Army Reserve soldiers in combat
support and “retail” combat sustainment units a
much greater chance of experiencing actual combined
arms training.
Beyond its primary goal of building readiness for
decisive action operations across the force, a training
experience such as this one would also yield a variety of secondary benefits. As one example, this venue
could serve as a mission rehearsal exercise for the few
Army Reserve units lucky enough to be tapped to
participate in National Training Center or other CTC
rotations. It is well-known that Army Reserve formations are often at a major disadvantage relative to their
active component peers at CTCs, as they often arrive
poorly equipped and largely unprepared. Other positive benefits of this training capability would be less
direct but equally beneficial. For example, an Army
Reserve CTC Lite would provide an additional opportunity for sets and reps for active Army and National
Guard formations. The preparation for these lower-level training exercises, envisioned at battalion
minus or company level and below, would also provide the three components opportunities to establish
Total Force training partnerships, which could then
extend to staff exercises, table-top exercises, warfighter exercises, and other similar training venues.
Another significant added benefit of this approach
would be to enhance morale and retention across the
Army Reserve by establishing the realistic possibility
of a unit “Super Bowl,” or a genuine opportunity to
conduct combined arms training, perhaps featuring
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some modern equipment from the modification table
of organization and equipment.
Expanding upon this idea, the creation of this training capability would have benefits well beyond that of
mitigating the major shortfalls in combined arms training that constitute the reality in today’s Army Reserve.
This platform could provide the focal point and guiding framework for a targeted buy of modern mission
command equipment and equipment from the modification table of organization and equipment, perhaps
using National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation funding. This modern equipment could then
be used year-round for individual soldier and leader
development training to help bridge some of the gaps
created by the Army’s cascading equipping strategy.
In a similar way, these opportunities could, in
turn, enhance Army Reserve recruiting and retention; this could occur on the front end by highlighting
available training opportunities and by giving units
the opportunity for a meaningful and challenging,
culminating training experience in the SRM cycle. The
Army Reserve could even create small mobile training
teams, such as those in the National Guard’s Exportable Combat Training Center program, to help units
prepare for CTC Lite during their home-station training prior to arriving. This capability could also serve
as a primary vehicle through which Army Reserve
leaders can begin to understand multi-domain operations and global integration in the context of greatpower competition, consistent with the requirements
of the 2018 NDS.
7. Revamp the Army Reserve’s task organization and
mission command relationships with the goal of realizing
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a reasonable and feasible span of control and maintaining
branch-focused “communities of practice.”
Command in the Army Reserve at battalion
level or above is usually a far-flung endeavor. As
an illustrative example, the 926th Engineer Brigade,
commanded by a TPU colonel in his or her first brigadelevel command, is comprised of more than 5,000 soldiers assigned to more than 50 units in dozens of
Army Reserve centers stretching across 8 southeastern
states. Some of the brigade’s 38 companies and even
some of the small detachments are the sole units in
particular geographic locations, with their battalion
headquarters located over 100 miles away.
As another example at the major subordinate command level, the 416th Theater Engineer Command is
commanded by a major general and is comprised of
more than 12,000 soldiers assigned to about 175 units
in more than 100 Reserve centers located in 26 states
west of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. Command
under these circumstances in an active duty setting
would be enough of a challenge by itself, but of course,
the great majority of the Army Reserve’s commanders are TPU or compensated part-time. Like any other
command in the Army, however, the daily requirements of these commands are persistent and broad.
The quick-win reforms outlined in chapter 6 will
help to mitigate these challenges in some important
ways. However, the recommendation here is that the
Army Reserve undertake a comprehensive effort to
right-size the span of control for mission command
of its battalions, brigades, and division-level units. A
reasonable first step for this effort would be to strive
to limit Army Reserve brigades and groups to about
2,500 soldiers or less and, similarly, to limit battalions
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to fewer than 1,000 soldiers. At the same time, the
Army Reserve could improve its training posture
by conducting a corresponding review and realignment of its like-type units within the SRM cycle,
both to enhance its leader development and to
improve the quality of training management, execution, and assessment.
Even as the Army Reserve overhauls its internal
mission command and task organization to make its
commanders’ span of control more feasible and reasonable, it will be important to maintain the communities of practice that currently exist within the various
operational and functional commands. That is, engineers should lead and oversee engineers, and so on, to
enable the leaders to achieve the most effective oversight of soldier and unit training and readiness. The
related issues of stay-behind modularity and the roles
of the regional readiness commands in this mix will
also need to be resolved and resourced.
8. Update the Army Reserve’s restationing model to make
it more forward-looking economically and demographically, with the specific goals of enhancing units’ ability
to fill their ranks and improving the quality of the soldier
experience.
Unit relocations are costly, emotional, and political events. The stronger the underlying model can
be, thus providing an analytical rationale for moving
units on the basis of robust, supporting, empirical evidence, the more likely these actions are to happen and
to be successful. These careful analyses and rational
assessments should be able to be shared broadly to
help inform public officials about the Army Reserve’s
strengths and challenges in given unit locations.
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Given the number of distressed units across the Army
Reserve, it is clear that we have much work to do to
make this process forward-looking, both economically
and demographically, and consequently more efficient
and effective. The coherent stationing of the Army
Reserve’s equipment and access to required training
areas should also be included in this comprehensive
analysis.
9. Undertake a holistic review of the Army Reserve
recruiting and retention model, with the goals of reaching a broader audience, increasing the public’s propensity
to serve, and acknowledging both the requirements and
benefits of serving. Include the recruiting community, local
commanders, and the operational and component staffs in
this holistic review.
The Army and the other services have become
highly sophisticated in their understanding of the
recruiting marketplace and have adapted their messaging and practices to maximize our recruiters’ prospects for achieving their mission. At the same time, it is
also clear that we are collectively swimming upstream
in light of societal trends. As broad measures of these
current challenges, the Army Reserve has failed to
meet its end-strength objectives for the past several
years by significant margins. We also know that about
50 percent of first-term enlistees are failing to make it
to the end of their initial enlistments, meaning that we
are expending great energy and resources in recruiting
and training individuals whose prospects for meeting
their service obligations come down to a coin flip.
Of course, the Army already makes a comprehensive effort to develop an understanding of its soldiers,
including finding out who is willing to serve and what
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their primary motivations are. The Army also works
hard to develop an understanding of what convinces
soldiers to stay in the ranks as well as what causes
soldiers to leave. Though focused solely on the active
Army, a recent RAND analysis of these questions drew
many important conclusions after interviewing 81
active Army soldiers.97 The study’s authors found that
most of the young, active-duty soldiers were generally
satisfied with their experiences in the early going of
their terms of service; however, the researchers recommended that the Army relook at the central themes of
its marketing campaigns. Based upon their interviews
with young soldiers, the researchers proposed messages that focus on “emphasizing the social aspects of
Army service” and providing “accurate information
about Army life” to prevent unrealistic expectations.98
In the same article, the SecArmy suggested focusing on a call to public service. These approaches are
consistent with the Sebastian Junger argument in the
book, Tribe, in which he highlights humans’ “strong
instinct to belong to small groups defined by clear
purpose and understanding.”99 In this vein, the Army
has recently reoriented its primary messaging toward
“service” and “warrior” themes, though it remains to
be seen what the results will be.
As is often the case, the Army Reserve shares many
of the active Army’s challenges, but must also contend
with other inhibitors. For example, an Army Reserve
Careers Division report of late 2017 found that among
97. Todd C. Helmus et al., Life as a Private: A Study of the Motivations and Experiences of Junior Enlisted Personnel in the US Army
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), https://www.rand
.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2252.html.
98. Helmus et al., Life as a Private.
99. Sebastian Junger, Tribe: On Homecoming and Belonging
(New York: Twelve, 2016), dustcover introduction.
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the nearly 6,000 Army Reserve personnel losses up
to that point in the fiscal year, the largest single category of loss was the more than 1-in-6 who had simply
departed at the end of their terms of service without
having engaged in adverse action.100 For those who
stayed, the three most oft-cited reasons for reenlisting
were financial: reenlistment bonuses, education benefits, and health benefits. The top motives identified for
not reenlisting were especially telling, however, as the
top five reasons cited in exit interviews were, in order,
civilian employment/job conflicts, family concerns/
hardships, unit training issues, unit leadership issues,
and flags.101
It is concerning that the primary motivations for
staying in the ranks in the Army Reserve are financial.
It is equally troubling that we seem to be doing a poor
job of enabling our soldiers to balance their competing
obligations or to even find reasons other than financial
ones to want to continue to serve. If we are to penetrate
the background noise of an increasingly connected
society, with the goal of attracting those most likely to
join and commit to meeting the standards of service, it
may be appropriate to place some of the scarce recruiting resources under the control of regional or local
commanders. In any event, we need to take a holistic,
honest, inclusive, and empirical approach to this complex problem set if we are going to find the innovative
solutions it will take to solve it.

100. Stacy Babcock, COL (USA), Army Reserve Career Division
Loss Report (December 18, 2017).
101. Babcock, Loss Report.
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10. Make a focused, enterprise-wide effort to increase the
quality of the Army Reserve experience to inspire those who
have the propensity to join to stay in uniform.
This final heavy lift is a natural extension of the
last one. In the face of changing American demographics and evolving cultural norms, we must make
every possible effort to retain all who decide to join.
In the typical interpretations of data on the recruits
and early-termers and their motivations and impressions of service, it is common to hear senior leaders
focus on financial incentives in seeking to attract and
retain service members. But while the financial benefits of belonging will always be an important part of
this equation, other aspects of the enlistees’ responses
are equally important. For example, an RFPB report of
2014 found that while 75 percent of Reserve members
were satisfied with the military way of life and felt
that their service was viewed favorably by their families and employers, satisfaction had begun to dip from
its 2009 peak.102 Many respondents attributed this dip
in satisfaction to the fact that they were experiencing a
diminished opportunity to deploy—or to “do stuff”—
and were therefore less enthusiastic about continuing
to serve. While the use of the reserve components as
an operational force in wartime is generally popular with them, the increasing peacetime readiness
requirements and associated demands on their time
are forcing tough decisions and trade-offs. Too often,
this results in our most talented members leaving.
The quick-win reforms aimed at improving Army
Reserve mission command should help to improve
this situation. However, it is incumbent upon leaders
across the Army Reserve enterprise to envision and
102. RFPB, 2014 Reserve Forces.
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realize the fundamental changes needed in our organization to make it a more attractive, meaningful, satisfying, and feasible place for our soldiers to serve our
nation. There is no doubt that our newest generation
of soldiers has significantly different expectations than
our most senior leaders.103 Therefore, it is incumbent
upon all of us to understand and accommodate this
new reality.

103. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Darren K.
Ford, The Millennial Challenge (CreateSpace Independent Publishing, April 13, 2014).
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8. “GOING DEEP”: UNCONVENTIONAL ROLES
FOR A DAUNTING FUTURE
The problem we are focusing on is how to “Win in a
Complex World.” “Win” occurs at the strategic level
and involves more than just firepower. It involves the
application of all elements of national power. “Complex”
is defined as an environment that is not only unknown,
but unknowable and constantly changing.
US Army Operating Concept: Win in a
Complex World, 2020-2040, 2014.104

The United States faces evolving strategic and
operational environments that are increasingly daunting and risk-laden, yet many emerging threats remain
unknown, or even unknowable. This profound uncertainty, which makes predicting the nature and scope
of America’s next foreign intervention even more difficult than it has been in the past, represents one of the
most challenging aspects of national security planning
in the twenty-first century. Accordingly, these “deep”
reform proposals aim to position the Army Reserve to
be able to provide the nation with strategic and operational flexibility in the face of an increasingly complex and uncertain future. Fortunately, these deep
reforms do not represent any real change to the Army
Reserve’s enduring mission; rather, they represent
a modern expansion of its scope. In fact, these goals
fit snugly within the Army Reserve’s DNA, given
its history of providing versatile, tailored, and costeffective capabilities to meet emergent needs.

104. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (2014), iii.
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The Emerging Environment as a Generator of
Requirements
Once described optimistically as the “end of history,” the twenty-first century has instead seen the
emergence of major challenges to Western, liberal,
democratic norms and values; a wavering international order; and the accelerating decline of failed and
failing states. At the strategic level, rising and revanchist nation-states have taken advantage of America’s
decisive engagements in the Middle East and Asia
to develop into near-peer threats, openly seeking to
dominate certain regions of the world. This return
to great-power competition requires that we apply a
global perspective, in contrast to the regional parsing
of our national security problems that was feasible in
the years after the Cold War.
Adding further complexity, populist movements
around the world, coupled with the effects of climate
change, the wide availability of disruptive technologies, and the internet-fueled ability of bad actors to
organize extremist movements through social media,
have destabilized governments and the world order.
These developments have also given rise to dangerous, ungoverned spaces around the world, even as
cash-strapped Western governments have limited
their investments in their security forces. Against this
backdrop, the United States must also reckon with its
unsustainable budget deficits and a rapidly increasing
national debt.
The emerging challenges are no easier at the operational level. Our potential adversaries have developed multi-domain operating capabilities, aiming to
achieve peer or near-peer status in particular domains
in order to neutralize specific American operational
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strengths. While the DoD was once the driver of many
developing technologies with defense applications, its
research and development budget is now dwarfed in
size by the comparable activities going on inside major
technology companies in the private sector. Advances
in disruptive technologies are emerging at an everincreasing pace, even as the private and public sectors
are still at the very leading edge of their development
of artificial intelligence, robotic swarming, neural networking and transmitting, three-dimensional printing, and other destabilizing technologies with future
defense applications. The US Army has begun to think
its way through these challenges and opportunities,
as was expressed most recently in TRADOC Pamphlet
525-3-1: The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028.
Recognizing these developments, Congress placed
a provision in the National Defense Authorization
Act of 2017 that required an independent, nonpartisan assessment of the implementation of the NDS.
Co-chaired by Ambassador Eric Edelman and Admiral Gary Roughead, the NDS Commission reported
its unclassified findings late in 2018. In its report, the
commission identified critical gaps between the aspirational ends and ways of the defense strategy and
the concepts and means currently available to realize
them. Asserting that “America’s rivals are mounting
comprehensive challenges using military means and
consequential economic, diplomatic, political, and
informational tools,” the report calls upon the DoD
to counter with new operational concepts, including
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“equally creative responses” to our rivals’ “unconventional approaches.”105
The NDS Commission report points to a wide
range of capability and capacity shortfalls across all
instruments of national power which will need to be
addressed if the NDS is to be operationalized fully. In
reality, most of these capabilities cannot be maintained
on a full-time basis, and these highly specialized skills
are expensive to teach and maintain in-house, especially given the accelerating pace of change in all
domains. But many of these specialized requirements
could potentially fit into the Army Reserve’s purview.
Realizing Untapped Potential for
Unconventional Roles
Building upon the thinking expressed in the Army
operating concept; the NDS Commission’s study,
TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1; and other recent accounts
of capability gaps in America’s national security enterprise, the primary goal of these deep reforms is to set
the conditions for the Army Reserve to link the Army,
the Joint Force, and our interagency partners to an
array of diverse and nontraditional capabilities that
might be required to address complex and unexpected
needs. The idea of tapping into civilian-acquired skills
has been floated before, including as part of former
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter’s first tranche of Force

105. National Defense Strategy Commission, Providing for
the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the
National Defense Strategy Commission (Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace, November 2018), vii-viii, https://www
.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense
.pdf.
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of the Future proposals in November 2015 and in past
RAND studies.106
In this envisioned expansion of the Army Reserve
mission, the institution would serve as a clearing house
or “temp agency” for specialized talents and capabilities identified by the Army, the Joint Force, and other
partner agencies and departments. This approach
would take advantage of the Army Reserve’s status as
a federal force that can be wholly responsive to periodic and emergent needs and leverage the recruited
individuals’ other-than-military placements outside
of government to outsource needed capability training, credentialing, and certification. The DoD could
also use this vehicle to tap into the rapidly evolving
technologies and expertise within various academic,
corporate, and other sectors. In this design, the Army
Reserve would maintain responsibility for the appropriate levels of recruited personnel military training in
advance of mobilization and utilization and all of their
administrative, security, and logistical requirements.
While the list that follows is not intended to be
exhaustive or exclusive of other possibilities, there is a
wide range of skills and expertise for which the Army
Reserve could be used to provide nontraditional talent
to help bridge various capability gaps. Some of these
capabilities could be applied at the strategic level,
while others could be employed at the operational
level. In some cases, these skills and expertise are
already represented among soldiers currently in the
Army Reserve, while other talent could be recruited
into the organization as future needs are identified.
106. Gregory F. Treverton et al., Attracting “Cutting-Edge”
Skills through Reserve Component Participation (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2003).
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As an illustrative sample, potential future contributions might include
• connecting to research or applications related to
emerging disruptive technologies;
• forming tiger teams for strategic thinking and
analysis tied to particular strategic issues or
supporting working groups in defense-related
agency or departmental activities;
• achieving an understanding and application of
the expanded instruments of national power
(diplomacy, information, military, economics,
finance, intelligence, and law enforcement) in
support of whole-of-government solutions to
national security issues;
• providing nontraditional, civilian expertise in
support of reconstruction and stability operations or other non-kinetic LOEs;
• contributing to the understanding of highly
complex, dense, urban terrain in particular theaters or in support of theater- or nation-specific
cultural awareness and understanding;
• augmenting research and development and
science and technology efforts inside of DoD
activities;
• integrating advances in medical technologies or
other organizational or corporate business practices into Army organizations and activities;
• understanding and applying the drivers of
changes in the nature of work skills, such as
increased longevity in the workforce, the rise of
smart machines and systems, the pervasiveness
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of sensors and global connectivity, and new
communication tools;107
providing academic or practitioner insights into
grand strategy and national strategic direction,
currently a major challenge for a national security staff typically consumed by responding to
near-term and emergent issues and crises;108
creating temporary think tanks or working
groups for the framing of contemporary foreign policy issues to help foster the deeper and
broader strategic thinking sought by former
Secretary Mattis and other senior DoD leaders;
bringing in specific expertise on an as-needed
basis or for short, rotational tours to assist with
particular regions or issues in support of the
National Security Council;
connecting temporary talent to the Defense
Innovative Unit Experimental or other similar,
full-time, innovation and research initiatives;
augmenting combatant command or Joint Task
Force staffs with specialized expertise pertaining to particular countries, regions, issues, or
adversary capabilities;
providing the organizing framework for an
alignment of technological development with a
major public purpose, such as a new Manhattan

107. Anna Davies, Devin Fidler, and Marina Gorbis, Future
Work Skills 2020 (Palo Alto, CA: University of Phoenix Institute for
the Future, 2011), 1-5.
108. Lew Irwin, MG (USA), Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means:
Learning from America’s Struggle To Build an Afghan Nation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012).
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Project, as proposed by former Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter;109
• organizing teams to study the ethics and implications of the employment of emerging weapons and disruptive technologies, including the
formation of policy recommendations to govern
their use; and
• augmenting cross-functional teams in Army
Futures Command.
Going Deep—Five Future Force Reform
Recommendations
Realizing this expansion of the Army Reserve’s
mission to help our nation grapple with an increasingly daunting, unpredictable, and risk-laden future
will require a series of legislative, structural, and policy
changes. Though ambitious in scope, this set of reform
proposals builds upon initiatives already underway
in the Army, the Army Reserve, and the DoD. Taken
together, these deep reforms will set the conditions for
the Army Reserve to expand its contributions to the
Army, the Joint Force, and our interagency partners in
America’s national security enterprise.
1. Achieve true talent management in the Army Reserve by
thoroughly and systematically inventorying and cataloging
all relevant, civilian-acquired skills and expertise.
If you bring up the subject of the reserve components to active-component commanders who served
in OEF or OIF, you are likely to hear stories of how
109. Ash Carter, “America Needs To Align Technology
with a Public Purpose,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, November 25, 2018, https://www.belfercenter.org
/publication/america-needs-align-technology-public-purpose.
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they discovered invaluable skill sets among the ranks
of their reserve soldiers. The skills these leaders cite
most often are those that proved to be particularly
valuable in the support of non-kinetic LOEs, such as
efforts at improving governance or the rule of law, the
conduct of stability and reconstruction operations, or
other similar requirements. Of course, these types of
skills are likely to be required again if the Army’s operating concept, the NDS Commission study, and The
Joint Operating Environment 2035, among other defense
publications, are correct. In fact, history tells us that
the United States is likely to intervene in the affairs of
other countries again in the future since these actions
have been routine throughout our history.
Unfortunately, these commanders’ discoveries
have no basis in current Army Reserve systems or
processes, as there is no real inventory of those skills
or attributes that might be helpful in a mission context. This untapped potential could fill real gaps. For
example, the United States went into Afghanistan with
almost no knowledge of Afghan culture or other relevant expertise, including basic language skills.110 As
a small sample of the diverse, civilian-acquired skills
and experience among the soldiers who have served
recently in the Army Reserve, the civilian careers of
my teammates have included a senior economist in
the Department of Commerce, Department of State
analysts, civilian members of the US Army Space and
Missile Defense Command, a General Electric top-5percent manager, an IBM senior executive, a member
of Congress, a Pennsylvania state senator, a chief
engineer for the City of Tacoma, a professor of civil
engineering at Vanderbilt University, superintendents
of schools, a professional staff member in the Senate
110. Irwin, Disjointed Ways.
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Armed Services Committee, and many others. In any
event, the Army Reserve’s current process for identifying its members’ civilian careers using the Civilian
Employer Information database is poorly executed and
exceedingly general in its categories, and therefore not
usable for these purposes.111 So the exceptionally rich
and diverse, other-than-military competencies that
reside in the Army Reserve are currently uncataloged,
and therefore remain untapped by the Army and Joint
Force, except by occasional happenstance.
Fortunately, the Army is already hard at work creating the information management platform needed
for a much more robust inventorying and cataloging of civilian-acquired skills and expertise, a system
known as IPPS-A. IPPS-A will include a module that
will enable a far more robust skill inventory. The recommendation here is to ensure that the module is
comprehensive enough to be useful and to enforce
its use and maintenance to create a true professional
skills inventory. IPPS-A should include specific and
well-constructed civilian skills and experience fields,
including language skills, civilian credentials, professional fields, civilian educational attainment, and a
variety of others.
2. Rescind the DoD policy prohibiting the mobilization of
Reserve component personnel for civilian-acquired skills
within prescribed service member-selected limits.
Gaining routine access to the Army Reserve’s
diverse, rich, civilian-acquired skills and expertise will
111. Jason Hollan, MAJ (USA), and Zach Galaboff, CPT
(USA), were very helpful in the process of identifying the Civilian
Employer Information database’s limitations as well as some of
our soldiers’ exceptional, civilian-acquired skills.
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require a change to the current DoD policy that prohibits the mobilization of reserve component service
members for that purpose.112 At the same time, service
members should be given the opportunity to register
their preferences for mobilizations tied to civilian-acquired skills or experience, with a needs-of-the-service
waiver of those preferences tied to particular levels of
mobilization authority.
3. Create a highly qualified expert branch within the
Army Reserve and distribute the experts among US Army
Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command,
Army Reserve Innovation Command, and other selected
organizations.
As the Army, the Joint Force, and our partners in
national security identify the specialized requirements
needed to support the NDS and National Military
Strategy, the Army should create a branch of highly
qualified experts inside the Army Reserve. There is
precedent for this designation within the PME system’s mentor program as well as the Army Reserve
portion of the Civil Affairs Branch (38-series officers).
The natural places to house these officers, NCOs, and
junior soldiers with specialized skills inside the Army
Reserve would be US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, Army Reserve Innovation Command, or selected Army Reserve element
billets to be created inside the organizations within
which these personnel would serve.

112. RFPB, Improving the Total Force, 49-53.
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4. Standardize and streamline access to the personnel in the
Army Reserve and other reserve components through the
adoption of major duty status reform.
Under current law, the various reserve components have more than 30 different duty statuses that
vary greatly by component and legal authority. There
is a major effort underway inside the DoD to reform
this convoluted, inefficient, and unwieldy system and
bring these dozens of statuses into alignment within
four categories, including aligning their corresponding
benefits and entitlements.113 These reforms would provide more flexibility and streamlined access and funding to bring soldiers on duty more quickly. The four
categories include active duty for operations; active
duty for training; federal reserve duty; and remote
duty, such as pay or points for distance learning.
5. Shift the primary responsibility for the management and
oversight of human resources in the IRR from US Army
Human Resources Command to the Army Reserve.
The IRR is generally underused and not closely or
carefully managed.114 Likewise, the IRR experiences
the same shortfalls in personnel management systems that the rest of the Army’s reserve components
do, including limited permeability between components.115 The recommendation is to incorporate the IRR
into the pool of available talent that will be tracked
in IPPS-A and to shift the primary responsibility for
its administration, management, and oversight to the
Army Reserve.
113. RFPB, Improving the Total Force, 42-44.
114. RFPB, Improving the Total Force, 58-59.
115. RFPB, Improving the Total Force, 50-52.
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A variety of recent assessments have demonstrated
that the Army and Joint Force are not well-matched
in many respects with the evolving, complex challenges and demands of the emerging strategic and
operational environments. Adopting these five deep
reforms would help to place the Army Reserve into
a defensive posture that would help the Army, the
Joint Force, and our interagency partners confront
unpredictable threats as they emerge. In this sense, the
Army Reserve can then become a “Swiss Army knife”
of carefully inventoried and cataloged, nontraditional
capabilities to be maintained in a pre-mobilization
state of availability to meet emergent needs.

129

CLOSING THOUGHTS:
CITIZENSHIP IN A FREE REPUBLIC
It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of
our system, that every citizen who enjoys the protection
of a free government, owes not only a proportion of his
property, but even of his personal services to the defense
of it.
Quotations of George Washington116

As our all-volunteer force becomes more expensive
and harder to recruit and maintain, and as the American public becomes more willing to use the military,
yet less willing to serve in it themselves, there may
come a time in the future when the idea of a national
public service obligation becomes more feasible politically and more desirable practically. As the epigraph
suggests, our first commander-in-chief would certainly endorse this idea. Phillip Carter and his colleagues from the Center for a New American Security
demonstrate persuasively in their careful analysis
of today’s all-volunteer force that the time for a serious national reckoning regarding the sustainability
of the volunteer force may be closer than we would
like to think.117
That said, Carter and his colleagues are not the
only contemporary thinkers who are contemplating
the possibility of more profound changes to American society and American circumstances in the years
ahead. As just a few relevant and disparate examples,
Richard Haass of the Council on Foreign Relations
has written about the coming changes in the nature of
116. George Washington, Quotations of George Washington
(Carlisle, MA: Applewood, 2003), 27.
117. Carter et al., AVF 4.0.
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work in an age of rising automation and globalization,
Sebastian Junger has written of the human need for
social connection, and many others have written about
the growing social, political, and economic divisions
and upheavals in American society today. Graham
Allison has written recently of the likelihood of majorpower conflict between the United States and China,
and the NDS emphasizes the return of great-power
competition and a growing uncertainty and unpredictability, even as information has already been weaponized to attack the very norms and institutions of
American society.
The point here is that, when viewed from this perspective, the example of the Army Reserve’s role in
leading the CCC from 1933 to 1942 during the Great
Depression is instructive and relevant. The reforms
recommended in this monograph are fairly conservative in the sense that they keep the Army Reserve’s
modern mission and structure essentially intact; however, they would also help to position the institution
to be able to provide the United States more profound
leadership and organizational capabilities should that
need arise someday. Whether that need comes in the
form of a new CCC, some hybrid national service
model, a need to better connect the American people
to their military, or something wholly unforeseen, the
Army Reserve will be ready.
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